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This thesis describes the history of Indonesia and East Timor as former colonial 
states. Indonesian leaders believed that East Timor was part of Indonesia’s pre-colonial 
family and legacy, but East Timorese were more influenced by the Portuguese’ 450 years 
colonialism. In 1975, the Government of Indonesia launched a military intervention and 
occupied East Timor. In the Cold-War era, having feared that the communist movement 
had infiltrated East Timor, the United States and its allies thus supported Indonesian 
military intervention in East Timor. The reaction of the international community was to 
condemn the Indonesian military intervention of East Timor. Indonesia always received 
some support from year to year in United Nations’ resolutions.  
This study examines the different views of major countries in the East Timor case 
during the Cold War and its aftermath. The situation in East Timor changed dramatically 
after the Cold War ended. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as a 
mature organization, will continue to play a critical role in the future of East Timor. This 
thesis concludes by exploring the ASEAN role in rebuilding East Timor both politically 
and economically. 
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In August 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence after more than 
400 years of colonization by the Portuguese and more that two decades of occupation by 
Indonesia. The international community, notably the United Nations and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), found that East Timor demonstrated the need to 
respond immediately in such conflicts. Knowing that the United States and its Cold War 
allies supported the Indonesian military intervention of East Timor in 1975, the UN thus 
found it difficult to intervene in East Timor, unless the Indonesian government was 
permitted to do so. This thesis describes the current East Timor crisis and examines 
prospective Indonesia-East Timor relations after the referendum. 
The first part of this thesis reviews the history of the relationship between 
Indonesia and East Timor. The East Timorese wanted a separate national identity from 
Indonesia because many East Timorese believed Indonesia was not their motherland. 
Only a few of them have links to Indonesia after more than 400 years of being colonized 
by the Portuguese.  
Portugal itself was under a dictatorship for about 50 years from 1926 to 1974 and 
its neutrality during World War II caused the Japanese to proceed slowly during the 
occupation of Portuguese Timor. Even after the end of WWII, Portugal did not pay much 
attention to Timor simply because the economic return was far less than the other five 
African colonies it controlled. The first hope for East Timor’s self-determination 
occurred in 1960 when the UN issued the resolution to grant independence to all 
 xviii 
colonized territories including Portuguese Timor. However, the Portuguese government 
estimated that East Timor was not yet ready to be an independent state. The thesis will 
thus investigate the emergence of East Timor’s nationalism and politics, as well as the 
Indonesian security concern over emergence of enemy forces in East Timor. 
This thesis describes the international responses to Indonesian military 
intervention in East Timor. A number of UN resolutions were passed calling for the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor. Though it was never recognized, the 
Government of Indonesia took the position that East Timorese integration into the 
Republic was the best solution concerning security in that region during the Cold War. 
President Suharto was very sure that Indonesia was not alone in occupying East Timor. In 
fact, Indonesia was backed by the United States and its allies, and supported by fellow 
ASEAN members as well. These events will thus challenge the UN position of the East 
Timorese case. 
In the post-Cold War era, with the reduction of the United States military 
presence in Southeast Asia, the powerful regime of Suharto was getting weaker and 
weaker. Finally, Suharto was forced to resign in 1998 because of the 1997 ongoing 
economic crisis in the whole region. Indonesia’s position in East Timor was also very 
precarious since the UN never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The 
thesis will review the role of the UN, the NGO’s, and the effect of East Timor’s 
independence both on Indonesia and the neighboring countries.  
 xix 
The thesis then recommends what can be done by the international community, 
the UN, the major countries and the ASEAN members, to build a future East Timor. It 
also identifies the importance of East Timorese reconciliation. 
In conclusion, the thesis gives a list of prospective alliances for the new East 
Timorese state. The ASEAN approach would most likely be a popular alliance if the 
problems between Indonesia and East Timor could be solved. ASEAN could be used as a 
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During the Cold War era, tension between the two blocks influenced security 
practices in all regions, including Southeast Asia. Support from the major countries, 
especially from the United States’ allies concerning Indonesia’s annexation of East 
Timor, illustrated Indonesia’s security dilemma. Given that Indonesia has contributed to 
stability and peace in the region, and the commitment of ASEAN members not to 
interfere in each other’s internal problems, Indonesia-East Timor disputes should have 
been considered a domestic problem. However, since the United Nations never 
recognized Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor, a diplomatic solution for the Indonesia-
East Timor conflict was never achieved. 
The East Timor crisis is a result of the problems of nation building in large, 
multiethnic societies. It also is a reiteration of the most dominant feature of the post-Cold 
War global order the emergence of ethnic and religious issues as major themes of state 
and security. Considerations such as historical roots and legacy, ethnic identities, 
civilization linkages, colonial experiences, geographic location, and linguistic and 
religious aspects need to be carefully taken into account for any objective assessment 
since most of these factors tend to be extremely complex in nature. 
A common phenomenon during the Cold War was the tendency of the armed 
forces to intervene when ethnic differences arose. Thus, the East Timor case also was 
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related to the role of the Indonesian military, and especially during President Suharto’s 
regime. 
Although they have a history of conflicts, Indonesia and East Timor are now 
starting to shape the future of Indonesia-East Timor relations. The role of post-
referendum Indonesia-East Timor relations has made East Timor more confident.   
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
Will Indonesia-East Timor relations be in the post referendum? Who are the bad 
guys and who are the good guys? An Indonesian is not ready yet to answer these 
complicated questions. The weakness of the international community so far, through the 
United Nations humanitarian intervention, has made a little progress towards constructing 
what East Timor will become. However, much time is needed to build confidence in the 
East Timor nation. In addition, the independence of East Timor could cause a domino 
effect within Indonesia’s internal territory, and even the whole region, simply because of 
the separatist movements seeking independence from Indonesian control. If East Timor 
did separate, why not the other provinces? Therefore, it is pertinent to examine what will 
be the best recommendations for further reconciliation in East Timor to maintain peace 
and stability in the region.      
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The cause of the Indonesian-East Timor conflict was the failure of Indonesia to 
ask for the opinion of the East Timorese. The East Timorese did not want to stand by 
again as another large government presumed to know what was best for East Timor. Even 
until recently, the conflict has centered mainly on East Timor’s struggle to establish a 
separate national identity. The conflict was, furthermore, complicated by ethnic and 
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religious tensions. The East Timorese feel themselves to be different, both ethnically and 
culturally, from the occupying Indonesians. They came from different ethnic groups than 
the people of Indonesia. But most importantly, they were influenced by Portuguese 
colonial rule, whereas Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch.1  
For the United Nations, the East Timor conflict has been ongoing since 1960 
when Portugal ignored the UN resolutions to grant independence to non-self –governing 
territories, including East Timor. This was followed by Indonesia failing to heed the 
relevant UN resolutions condemning its 1975 military intervention of East Timor and 
calling on it to withdraw its military. Additionally, the UN failed to act on its own 
resolution.2  
The UN, backed by Australia and The United States, is thus of vital importance to 
East Timor. However, the UN is also perversely a potential hazard to the new East Timor 
state. There is a danger that the planned UN bureaucratic presence, the so-called “UN 
kingdom,” will stifle or retard the political processes in East Timor that the East 
Timorese leaders and the East Timorese population need to work through for 
themselves.3  
The pro-Indonesia militia groups are also considered one of the main problems 
connected to the future East Timor. According to the UN investigation, there was 
evidence of the TNI (Indonesian Military) supporting the pro-integration militia groups. 
In fact, the militia has long had a role in the policing and defense of Indonesia, which, 
                                                 
      1Taro McGuinn, Island in Turmoil, World in Conflict, 1998 
2 Geoffrey C. Gunn, East Timor and the United Nations: the Case for Intervention, 1997 
3 Damien Kingsbury, Guns and Ballots boxes: East Timor’s vote for Independence, Monash Asia 
 4 
according to Indonesian law, is referred to as a ‘trained civilian.’ The term ‘militia’ 
became popular with the foreign press as East Timor came to the attention of the 
international community. Consequently, they have been part of the TNI’s strategy in East 
Timor since 1975.4  
Many Asian scholars argued that the future East Timor would rely heavily on 
Indonesia relations. Since Indonesia is a key country of ASEAN, it is expected that 
ASEAN also will play a significant role in East Timor’s future security arrangements. 
However, East Timor is also dependent on its leadership to find its future international 
relations. Unquestionably, ASEAN can help rebuild the East Timor state when 
Indonesia’s rule in East Timor has completely come to an end.5  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Before determining the research questions, it is necessary to understand what the 
basic argument or proposition is of this thesis. Therefore, the thesis statement will be: 
“The relationship between an independent East Timor and Indonesia will be 
influenced by the norms of the ASEAN framework, rather than the norms of the 
international state.”      
To guide the direction of the thesis, there are several questions that can be used to 
determine the goals and scope of the study. 
 
 
                                                 
Institute, 2000 
4 Ibid. 
5 Richard Tanter, Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community, 
 5 
The primary question: 
• What is the proper relationship between Indonesia and East Timor in the 
post referendum? 
Supporting questions: 
• What was the core conflict in East Timor both during the Cold War and 
after? 
• How did the international community respond to the Indonesian-East 
Timor conflict? 
• After the referendum, what has the United Nations and the international 
community done to rebuild the East Timor nation? 
• What is the response of the ASEAN members in rebuilding Independent 
East Timor? 
• What will be the proper alliances for the future East Timor? 
E. THESIS SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of the thesis will cover developments mainly since 1975, when 
Indonesia, with Western support, was campaigning for military intervention in East 
Timor. To understand the entire situation in East Timor, it is necessary to begin by 
examining the historical background of both Indonesia and East Timor, including the 
cultural and ethnic differences, social affairs and government behavior of the two 
countries. 
The thesis will also examine the response of the international community, the 
NGO’s, Human Rights Watch, and regional organizations to the Indonesia-East Timor 
conflict. It will describe the conflict between the two paradigms: the Cold War era and 
the post-Cold War era. 
                                                 
2001 
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The thesis will make reasonable recommendations for future Indonesia-East 
Timor relations. It will highlight the cost and benefits arising from the changing nature of 
the post-Cold War world order based on international and regional perspectives, scholar’s 
predictions, interested players, NGOs’ statements and the East Timorese leaders 
themselves. 
F. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used in this thesis is to analyze the conflict in East Timor on 
both a national and international level drawing from previous research, as well as a 
literature search of books, magazine articles, internet articles, an eye witness survey if 
needed, and other information sources in order to provide an appropriate frame of 
reference and information. All data and information will be analyzed to draw 
recommendations and conclusions. 
In some chapters, the analysis will use the comparative method as well as case 
studies to understand the differences between the conflict in East Timor and other 
regional and international conflicts. The idea of using these methods is to determine 
which level of analysis can best explain this conflict.   
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I presents a general introduction about Indonesia-East Timor relations in 
the world order and is followed by the scope and guideline of the thesis. Chapter II will 
give the historical background of the countries in dispute and the timeline of colonial 
experiences in these countries. Chapter III will try to investigate the international context 
of Indonesia-East Timor in the Cold War and after, especially from the perspectives of 
the regional and major powers, and the United Nations. Chapter IV will then analyze the 
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legal issues of the conflict in East Timor before, during, and after the Indonesian 
occupation. Chapter V will compare the East Timor crisis to other conflicts, both 
domestic and international. Chapter VI will analyze the current ASEAN response to 
rebuilding East Timor nation. It should answer the question of what can be done by the 
ASEAN states after East Timor becomes an independent state. Chapter VII will then 
analyze recommendations in an international context for the rebuilding of East Timor 
based on the lessons learned from other global conflicts, the sharing of common interests, 
fair reconciliation, refugee matters, and the UN effort towards transitional government of 
East Timor. Chapter VIII will be a prospective conclusion important to further security 
practices in the region although they will face simultaneously external and internal 
challenges since there are numerous players with differing interests and objectives, which 
is worthwhile to investigate in all sectors. Therefore, while resolving past problems in a 
less tense situation, both players should now adapt themselves to more flexible relations. 
In promoting East Timor on the global level, a regional security system could be an 
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To introduce both Indonesia and East Timor in the modern era, one should also 
understand the historical background of where the words “Indonesian” and “Timorese” 
originated. Thus, this introduction will summarize some of the pre-western colonial era of 
Indonesia. 
1. Pre-Western Colonial Indonesia 
Before the western colonial era, even allowing for a lack of reliable data, it was 
clear that Indonesia was the world’s largest island entity, and the tiny size, fragmentation, 
and ecological diversity of the archipelago had always fostered development. This 
tendency had been augmented by the difficulties of travel overland and the dominating 
role of the sea as a medium for human movement and cultural diffusion. 
Many historians argue that there are four basic threads in Indonesian history 
which go far in explaining its intricate ethnic and cultural pattern. First, its location 
athwart the sea links between the two great Asian cultures of China and India has made 
Indonesia a frontier for influences stemming from both these countries. Second, since 
prehistoric times the archipelago has experienced a stream of cultural intrusions, each 
change initially only in random locations and each modified in terms of existing patterns 
to yield an ‘Indonesianised’ version which spread later to other parts of this island world. 
Third, a persistent feature of the multitude of islands, large and small, is the sharp 
contrast between the peoples on the coasts and those from the forested hilly interiors. 
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Finally, the rivalry for political and commercial supremacy between the centrally located, 
agriculture based realms of Java and the trade-oriented realms using the Strait of Malacca 
has provided a continuing theme since the dawn of recorded history.6  
a. Nusantara: The Golden Age of Indonesia 
In the fourteenth century, long before the arrival of Dutch and Portuguese 
colonizers, the era of Majapahit rule the old Javanese Hindu-Buddhist empire had 
passed into popular legend as a ‘golden age’ of Indonesian history and served as a source 
of symbolism for many nationalists in modern Indonesia. The empire was established not 
by the king but by his prime minister, Gajah Mada. He was Majapahit’s prime minister 
who for the first time codified the laws, customs, and policies. Many historians have 
considered Gajah Mada as the country’s first nation-builder. He succeeded in unifying 
the archi pelago into one single state. As written in Nagarakertagama7 by Prapanca in 
1365, the ‘Palapa8 oath’ pledged by Gajah Mada as a symbol of the whole unified 
archipelago, or Nusantara, in which he accomplished his unification mission over the 
whole region including Sumatra, Malacca, Borneo and the eastern archipelago of Bali, 
Maluku, and Timor, shown in Figure 1. 
b. Who are the Indonesians?      
Long before the western colonizers came, the Indonesians used to call 
their country ‘Nusantara’ (nusa-antara; nusa means Island and antara means between). It 
                                                 
6 Donald W. Fryer and James C. Jackson, Indonesia, p. 24.  
7 Negarakertagama is the epic composed by Prapanca in 1365 that assigns to Majapahit a huge empire 
comprising dependencies throughout the modern day Indonesia and much of the Malay Peninsula, Tumasik 
(old Singapore), and the Eastern part of present day Indonesia. (Indonesia: A Country Study)   
8 Palapa is the old Indonesian Sanskrit name of coconut (fruit of labor) in which Gajah Mada 
promised not to drink the water inside the palapa before he could unify the whole archipelago during the 
Majapahit Empire. Today, the Palapa is used by the Indonesians to rename it for the Indonesian domestic 
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is descriptive enough etymologically, for Indonesia consists of an array of island 
stepping-stones scattered in the sea between mainland South and Southeast Asia and 
Australia. It is also located between the Pacific and Indian oceans. However, the 
nationalists and the Republic chose the Greek name over the Indonesian to indicate that 
modern Indonesia wishes to be identified with the modern world community which is 
Western-oriented.9   
  
Figure 1. Map of the Eastern Archipelago in the Pre-Western Colonial Era. 
From Ref: [M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia] 
According to many historians, Indonesia is not a nation in the sense that Iceland 
is. It is more a complex mixture of closely related cultures which share more or less a 
common history, like the United Kingdom, but on a larger scale of pluralism than any 
                                                 
satellites.    
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other European nation west of the Soviet Union. While it has a certain claim to a 
common identity, there is no particular ethnic or cultural reason why the nation should 
have its present boundaries. It is only because of the historical forces which assigned a 
different sovereignty to parts of Borneo and Timor. Former British Borneo in the 
northwestern sector is now divided into three states, eastern Timor and another tiny 
portion of Timor belonged to Portugal, and Singapore is a sovereign country. 
Unfortunately, the claim that historical Indonesian empires had similar boundaries has 
never been scientifically verified by the Western colonizers as described earlier in the 
written historical evidence of Nagarakertagama. Therefore, if the people in northern 
Borneo and eastern Timor have in general no interest in being Indonesian, it is because of 
their historical connection with Western colonization.11    
c. National Identity      
As outlined in the previous section, the many symbols used by 
Indonesians today reflected the golden age era of the Majapahit Emperor in the 13th 
century. Suharto uses the term ‘Wawasan Nusantara’ or archipelago outlook to refer to 
today’s Indonesian identity. This doctrine is aimed at ensuring the geographical unity of 
the archipelago as well as achieving the ideal unity of its people. As Gajah Mada did in 
the pre-colonial era, Sukarno and Suharto assure that the national resilience and the unity 
of the Indonesians are the answers to the challenges posed by a world still dominated by 
tension.12 Therefore, the Indonesian leaders believe that without national resilience, the 
archipelago could fall apart very easily.        
                                                 
9 Allen M. Sievers, The Mystical World of Indonesia, pp. 3-15. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Alagappa, pp. 477 and 504. 
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Another Indonesian identity is the “Bhineka Tunggal Ika.” In a country 
covering a wide area and so segmented by seas, jungles, mountains, and swamps, 
diversity is inherent and the ideal of unity difficult to actualize. Thus, the motto of 
“Bhineka Tunggal Ika” from the early historical golden age of Indonesia is the only 
doctrine that can unify the diversity of the Indonesians. This motto is usually translated 
“Unity in Diversity” and also rendered as ‘the many remain one.’ It also asserts that 
genuine culture gaps can be bridged. The doctrine may be stated in the slogan: “The 
Indonesian nations are one, the Indonesian nation is one.”13 
d. Indonesian Identity links to the Timorese 
In the case of “East Timor Identity,” many of the East Timorese did not 
realize that West and East Timor did not exist before the colonizers arrived in the 16th 
century. Even the word Timor itself, as asserted by Taro McGuin, came from the 
Indonesian language “timur” meaning “east.” He also describes how the island got its 
name since it is the easternmost large island in a long chain stretching from Sumatra in 
the west to Java and the Lesser Sundas (Bali, Flores, and Timor) in the east (see Figure 
1). The division between East Timor and West Timor is primarily political. No physical 
feature distinguishes the two.  
As in the Dutch and British colonies, over the years the Portuguese 
soldiers, sailors, and merchants intermarried with the native peoples of Timor. Although 
only a few people in East Timor are of entirely Portuguese ancestry, many East Timorese 
have at least one Portuguese ancestor.14 Those who have entirely Portuguese ancestry 
                                                 
13 Sievers, p. 14. 
14 McGuinn, pp. 7-15. 
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mainly belonged to the FRETILIN group, the later East Timorese leaders (described later 
in the next section). 
2. The Dutch and the Portuguese 
This island has always belonged to a different ethnic group than its neighbor 
Indonesia. The territorial agreement brokered by the International Court of Justice had 
divided the Island of Timor down the middle in 1914 for the convenience of the Dutch 
and the Portuguese. It came under the colonial occupation of the Dutch and the 
Portuguese. The latter controlled East Timor for more than four centuries after the Dutch 
ceded it to Portugal under an agreement in the early 16th century. 
Generally, amongst the many smaller ethnic groups, two principle populations can 
be differentiated: the Atoni who inhabit the mountains at the center of the island or what 
is now West Timor, and the Belu, subsequent invaders, who arrived in 300 BC from the 
Moluccas and Celebes. Both islands are now part of Indonesia. The most fundamental 
difference between the two peoples of Timor is the very different historical experiences 
under the Catholic Portuguese and the Calvinist Dutch. Unlike West Timor, East Timor 
experienced few deep-rooted changes in traditional society from the Pre-Western 
Colonial era to the Portuguese era and the Indonesian occupation. The Portuguese 
themselves governed through indirect rule, exercising what influence they could through 
the local rulers and chieftains. For a long period, Dominican missionaries and the 
powerful 'mestico' (part-Portuguese, part-Timorese) families, known as the Black 
Portuguese or Topasses, represented Portuguese authority. Even during Indonesian 
occupation, traditional social and political structures derived their strength from their 
 15 
family and clan connection. Therefore, it was difficult for Indonesians to have tried to 
restore ‘age-old ties of brotherhood’ after a 450- year period of Portuguese colonialism.15 
Portugal itself was under dictatorship for about 50 years: Salazar (1926-1968) and 
Caetano (1968-1974), and its neutrality during World War II put constraints on the 
Japanese to go slow on the occupation of Portuguese Timor. Even after the end of the 
war, Portugal did not pay much attention to Timor simply because economic returns were 
far less than the other colonies it controlled. The process of decolonization began after 
the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 in Portugal. The revolution led to two years of 
great political disorder in Portugal, which witnessed the reemergence of the pro-Moscow 
Portuguese Communist Party, which was only brought to an end when there was a 
legislative election for a presidential candidate in which Mario Soares from the Socialist 
Party won the election to become president in 1986 and remained in power until 1996.16 
In some aspects, though never recognized by Jakarta, Portugal’s policies were very 
similar to those of the later Netherlands-Indies colonial regime. In the two decades 
between 1900 and 1920, the Dutch educated far more natives than they had done before; 
they systematically invested large sums in development, especially in communication, 
transportation, and infrastructure; and they created an elaborate police apparatus for 
surveillance and intervention. In a similar manner, when Indonesia occupied East Timor in 
the 1980s, there was the same explosive mixture of education, development, surveillance 
and intervention that contributed to steadily deepening and widening East Timor 
nationalism, especially among the young. The government of Indonesia allowed many 
                                                 
15 Peter Carey, East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity, Conflict 
Studies No. 293/294, pp. 1-2. 
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East Timorese youngsters to have their education in Indonesian universities. However; the 
Timorese Catholic Church also massively expanded its membership and increasingly 
voiced the aspirations of this nationalism. The population of nationalists then had 
increased almost tenfold since the last days of Portuguese rule.17 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL FORMATION 
IN EAST TIMOR 
In early May 1974, recognizing that there was a vacuum of power, East Timorese 
thus organized themselves into a number of parties. The three major parties, mentioned in 
the previous section, had become the ruling parties with different goals. The UDT (the 
Timorese Democratic Union) was generally conservative and pro-Portuguese. It initially 
advocated continued ties with Lisbon, but the leaders soon became collaborators during 
the Jakarta intervention.18  
The other reformed party, the ASDT (the Timorese Association of Timorese 
Social Democrats), later known as FRETILIN (the Revolutionary Front for Independent 
East Timor), advocated “the universal doctrines of socialism and democracy.” Fully 
committed to independence from the beginning, it envisioned an eight-to-ten-year 
decolonization period in which the East Timorese would develop the political and 
economic structure necessary for independence. Both the UDT and the ASDT drew their 
leadership largely from the middle and upper class Timorese who had studied at the 
Jesuit college at Soibada and the seminary outside of Dili, and who were colonial 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Carey and Bently, East Timor at the Crossroads, p. 62. 
18 “The UDT leaders were thus summoned to meet the top generals in the Indonesian capitol, and on 
11 August 1975, with the backing of the Dili Police Chief, they launched a coup designed to wrest power 
from the Portuguese and halt the growing popularity of FRETILIN.” Carey, East Timor: Third World 
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administrators and school teachers. East Timor’s wealthiest citizens tended to support the 
UDT. They included senior administrative officials, native leaders, and prominent 
plantation owners.19  
The last party formed in May 27, 1974, APODETI (the Timorese Popular 
Democratic Association), favored integration with Indonesia. Its initial name was 
“Associacao Para Integratio de Timor na Indonesia.”20 Its manifesto called for: “An 
autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international 
law and the teaching of the Indonesian language as a compulsory object.” Their important 
leaders were Guilherme Goncalves, a liurai (local chieftain) from the border area, 
Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, a southern-based cattle-rancher, and Osario Soares, a 
schoolteacher and administrative official. Indonesians realized by June 1974 that 
APODETI would not have any chance of winning the popular vote. Thus, Indonesian 
officials felt that they had a responsibility to urge the Timorese to think positively about 
integration based on such arguments as the historical connections with the Indonesians, 
geographical reasons, and ethnicity. They were also inclined to believe that Indonesians 
would be more likely to accept the popular will of the Timorese if the option of joining 
with Indonesia was openly and impartially presented to the Timorese community,21 as 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik assured the FRETILIN representation, Ramos 
Horta, in June 1974. 
                                                 
Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity, pp. 2-4.  
19 Mathew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, pp. 25-26.   
20 ASDT, Its original name  the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia  was 
quickly changed for public relation purposes. Matthew Jardine, p. 26. 
21 John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, pp. 38-40. 
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The Government of Indonesia until now still adheres to the following 
principles: 
• The Independence of every country is the right of every nation, 
with no exception for the people of East Timor. 
• The Government as well as the people of Indonesia has no 
intention to increase or to expand their territory, or to occupy other 
territory other than to stipulate the 1945 Constitution. 
• ...Whoever will govern Timor in the future after independence, can 
be assured that the Government of Indonesia will always strive to 
maintain good relations, friendship, and cooperation for the benefit 
of both countries…22  
During the period from April to June 1974, ASDT (now renamed FRETILIN) 
remained much less popular than UDT. However, it was not until the elections for village 
heads, held in July 1975, and after the coup attempt by UDT in August, that  FRETILIN 
enjoyed a high degree popularity within the population. The reason for this popularity 
was that FRETILIN was building up its power base by working with existing political 
alliances based on kinship, and taking concepts and ideas prevalent in traditional society 
as the bases for the development of its programs. FRETILIN also emerged as a 
nationalist movement with extensive popular support and effective decentralized 
structure. They, finally, proclaimed East Timor an independent country on November 28, 
1975, and named it the Democratic Republic of East Timor. However, Portugal rejected 
FRETILIN’s unilateral declaration of independence, and also rejected the so-called 
‘Balibo Declaration’ of integration into Indonesia on November 30, 1975 signed by UDT, 
APODETI, and some other parties.23   
                                                 
22 Sony Inbaraj, East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN, pp. 29-30. 
23 Carey and Bentley, pp. 35-36. 
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In the process of revolution, parties were created to promote democracy in East 
Timor. This resulted in the establishment of three political parties: the Democratic Union 
of Timor (UDT), the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) which later 
became the Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), and the 
Timorese Democratic People’s Union (APODETI). While the FRETILIN was a left-wing 
radical organization that demanded total independence, the APODETI promoted 
integration with Indonesia. The East Timorese held local elections in early 1975, in 
which the FRETILIN won 55 percent of the vote and combined with UDT vote 
constituted nearly 90 percent of the people supporting these two parties. While the battle 
for political supremacy was beginning to rage between FRETILIN and UDT, Jakarta 
realized that unless it acted quickly, it would find that FRETILIN had swept the board. In 
that situation, it seemed best for the Indonesian military leaders to support and encourage 
UDT, which actually motivated the UDT to stage a coup against the leftist FRETILIN in 
August 1975. This was challenged by FRETILIN through an armed struggle, leading to 
the establishment of its supremacy. During this struggle, Portuguese recalled their 
government in East Timor, which secretly left Timor on August 27, 1975.24 Thus, neither 
the handover of the administration to the locals nor decolonization took place. Therefore, 
East Timor continued to be a Portuguese colony because they never gave up power nor 
were they driven out. 
On the other hand, the developments in Dili were greeted with alarm in Jakarta. 
Political parties, freedom of speech, the end of censorship, social democracy, 
independence, and an internationally supervised referendum were all deeply threatening 
                                                 
24 Carey and Bently, East Timor at the Cross Road, p. 35. 
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concepts for the Indonesian military leaders. After Indonesia’s struggles to preserve the 
unitary Republic from the secessionists (Moluccas, Ambon 1950), federalists (Sumatra 
1957-58, North Celebes 1957-61) and Communist revolts in Java and the outer islands 
(1948, 1965), the East Timor situation, from a nationalist perspective, would have 
jeopardized everything that had been won at the cost of so much blood. Therefore, the 
uncertain situation had attractions for all parties in East Timor, as well as for the 
Portuguese and the Indonesians. FRETILIN itself had a potent military. The Armed 
Forces of the National Liberation of East Timor (FILANTIL) and FRETILIN’s military 
wing, formed on August 19, 1975, consisted of 2,500 professional troops, another 7,000 
who had received military training under the Portuguese and some 10,000 who had 
attended short courses. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Portugal’s military forces were also equipped with the most modern NATO weaponry, 
which now fell into FRETILIN’s hands and explained why it was common for the 
Indonesian military leaders to be concerned about helping ‘friendly’ parties in East 
Timor.25 
With FRETILIN winning the civil war because of its larger following and better 
arms, and beginning to take control of the administration, the Indonesians were plotting to 
intervene militarily. Sensing that the Indonesian intervention was imminent, FRETILIN 
declared independence on November 28, 1975, as a pre-emptive move. As the guardians 
of Indonesia’s national integrity, the Indonesian military was principally concerned that an 
independent East Timor might stimulate separatist tendencies among discontented ethnic 
groups in neighboring Eastern Indonesia, such as the West Timorese and the Ambonese. 
                                                 
25 Carey, Conflict Studies, pp. 3-4. 
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In the aftermath of the Communist victories in Indochina in April 1975, Indonesia’s 
military leadership was also obsessed with the risk of Communist infiltration and 
insurgency. To the military, therefore, integration was the only acceptable solution for 
East Timor.26   
To know more in depth how East Timorese view their political scenario, the 
following events might better explain the situation starting from when they struggled to 
get their freedom, the events during the civil war, and the core conflict in East Timor.   
1. Independence Struggle 
Historically, the people of East Timor had had experiences with self-
determination. The first time in 1949, soon after the Indonesians obtained their 
independence from the Dutch. The people of East Timor waged a similar struggle for 
independence, which the Portuguese forces harshly put down. For three more decades, 
the Portuguese would rule over East Timor which they no longer considered a colony but 
an “overseas province” of Portugal. Portugal formalized this in an amendment to the 
Portuguese constitution. Nevertheless, that did not stop the United Nations from 
condemning Portugal for refusing to allow its colonial subjects the right to self-
determination. 
The second time was on April 25, 1974, when the Portuguese military overthrew 
the government in Portugal and soon after declared that the Portuguese colonies of Asia 
and Africa, including East Timor, would be accorded their democratic rights. The 
Portuguese authority allowed the people of East Timor to form political parties and 
started the process which would lead to a referendum. In that referendum the people of 
                                                 
26 Carey and Bentley, East Timor at the Crossroads, p. 62. 
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East Timor would choose from three options: to become an autonomous territory under 
Portuguese rule, to become an independent country within or outside a Portuguese 
commonwealth; or to join the Republic of Indonesia as its 27th province.27 
2. Civil War 
On August 20, 1975, using weapons supplied by the Portuguese, FRETILIN 
forces seized Dili, the capital of East Timor. Civil war had broken out. Instead of 
restoring order, the Portuguese authorities abandoned East Timor on August 26, 1975. 
While the civil war was threatening to spill over to Indonesian territory, on November 28, 
1975, FRETILIN unilaterally proclaimed independence. The following day, the 
APODETI, UDT, and other political groups proclaimed independence and simultaneous 
integration with the Republic of Indonesia. On December 7, 1975, with Indonesian 
military assistance, they retook Dili from the FRETILIN forces and 10 days later 
proclaimed a Provisional Government. Both the Provisional Government of East Timor 
and the Indonesian Government sought UN participation in oversight of the 
decolonization process, but the UN chose not to act. Therefore, the Provisional 
Government proceeded to construct an elected People’s Assembly.28 
3. The Nature of the Conflict in East Timor 
After the abandonment by the Portuguese, what appeared to be a common 
phenomenon was the tendency by the Indonesian armed forces to either intervene or 
usurp power when ethnic difference arose. Mc Guinn argued that one of the aspects of 
Indonesian occupation that the East Timorese most objected to was the failure to be asked 
                                                 
27 Inbaraj, pp. 22-24. 
28 The Untold Story of East Timor. http://www.deplu.go.id/english/timtim.htm   
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for their opinion. They did not want to stand by again as another large government 
assumed to know what was best for East Timor. Even until recently, the conflict centers 
mainly on East Timor’s struggle to establish a separate national identity.29   
In addition, the conflict was furthermore complicated by ethnic and religious 
tensions. The East Timorese felt dissimilar, both ethnically and culturally, from the 
occupying Indonesians. They came from different ethnic groups than the people of 
Indonesia, but mostly they were influenced by Portuguese colonial rule, whereas 
Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch. Religion was not the main concern since a large 
majority of Indonesians are Muslim, and the Timorese are Roman Catholic. Occasionally, 
religious tensions occurred between the Indonesian military and the East Timorese 
protesters but there was no fighting between East Timor and the West Timorese. As it 
stands however, East Timor’s troubles were a non-religious conflict. In fact, the struggle 
in East Timor was a separatist movement, which meant that the East Timorese were 
fighting to preserve their own language and culture, not their nation.23  
C. INDONESIA’S INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION 
Domestic politics within Indonesia played its part in prompting military action in 
East Timor. Although Suharto came to power on the promise of restoring political and 
economic order in the country by undertaking drastic measures to change the 
constitution, the so-called “New Order” continued with the 1945 Constitution, which 
vested enormous powers in the hands of the president. The only visible change was the 
use of ruthless power to eliminate opposition to military rule. However, the military itself 
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was not a unified force. The armed forces, with whose backing Suharto remained in 
power, were ridden with factions.30 
After the Communist coup in 1965, Sukarno was formally removed from power 
and Suharto appointed president. Thus the ‘New Order’ proceeded to impose control over 
the remaining political forces. The political parties were required to merge into two 
officially endorsed parties; the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or the United 
Development Party, and a merger between the nationalist and Christian parties, became 
known as the Partai Demokratik Indonesia (PDI) or the Indonesian Democratic Party. 
The other party, which is never referred to as a political party because politics 
under the Suharto regime was always seen as disreputable, was the Gologan Karya 
(Golkar) or a group of functionaries. This became the state party. All government 
officials and employees automatically became members of Golkar; which also enjoyed 
the benefit of strong army support during parliamentary elections. This three-party 
system, which was strengthened heavily in Golkar’s favor, ensured the state party would 
always dominate the parliament bolstered by representatives of the armed forces in their 
allocated seats.31 Therefore, Suharto claimed that it was never his intention to serve as 
president for life, but the system he constructed made it possible to run. 
During the last two decades of the Suharto administration, although the Cold War 
had not ended yet, Indonesia was not faced with any Communist threats as its neighbors 
were. However, there were small, active, and secessionist movements namely Aceh, West 
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31 Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, The East Timor Question: the Struggle for Independence 
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Irian, and East Timor rebellions. Of the three groups, the question of East Timor has 
proven to be the most difficult security and diplomatic problem for Jakarta. Fearful of 
Communist infiltration, Jakarta worried that East Timor could become a “Cuba on the 
doorstep” that could be used as a base for incursions by unfriendly powers into Indonesia. 
Thus, the major countries such as the United States and Australia accepted this idea. 
Additionally, it feared that an independent East Timor within the confines of Indonesia’s 
national territory would spark secessionist sentiments elsewhere in the archipelago. This 
is what has been happening recently in Aceh and West Irian.32  
D. THE ROLE OF SUHARTO’S MILITARY REGIME 
The Sukarno experience of ‘Guided Democracy’ left widespread hope that the 
Indonesian armed forces, and especially the Army, that dominated government would 
establish a “Suharto’s New Order” that would at last open the way to prosperity and 
progress. In fact, the Indonesian army had become politicized acquiring a political 
orientation and political interests at the time of the revolution against the Dutch. Later, 
after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army and the other branches of the 
armed forces became deeply involved in politics, civil administration, and economic and 
business management. The result was the army became the key element in the 
government coalition under Guided Democracy. During the Suharto administration, 
under Suharto’s New Order, the army officers consolidated their political power and 
expanded their economic interests. Although many of the policies the new government 
implemented contrasted sharply with those of the old regime, they did not occur from the 
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adoption of a new philosophy of social reform but because they were better suited in the 
new circumstances for the furtherance of interests that the army had established many 
years earlier.33  
Along with its economic interests, the army was also deeply rooted in the political 
arena since Indonesian independence in 1945 which the UN recognized in 1949. During 
the Sukarno Guided Democracy period, the army’s perception of itself as an active 
participant in day-to-day politics and other nonmilitary fields became deeply entrenched. 
The development of the army in nonmilitary fields could be seen at its first seminar held 
in April 1965. The army produced a doctrine which declared that the armed forces in 
Indonesia formed a “military force and social-political force.” As a social political force, 
the army’s activities covered ‘the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural, and 
religious field.’ The army leaders thus upgraded the role of the Indonesian Military with 
its second seminar, held in August 1966 when Sukarno was forced to step down by the 
army leaders due to his involvement in the 1965 communist coup.34 Realizing that the 
nation was in danger, the seminar thus declared that: 
The Army, which was born in the cauldron of the Revolution, has never 
been a dead instrument of the government concern exclusively with 
security matters. The army, as a fighter of freedom, cannot remain neutral 
toward the course of state policy, the quality of government, and the safety 
of the state based on Pancasila.29 The army does not have an exclusively 
military duty but is concerned with all fields of social life.35    
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35 Harold Crouch, p. 345. 
 27 
During the New Order period, this doctrine was known as the Dwi Fungsi (Dual 
Function) of the armed forces. The continued army domination of the state during the 
1970s was justified because the civilians still needed the strong leadership that only the 
army could provide. Another reason why Suharto created the Dwi Fungsi for the 
Indonesian military was military expenditure matters. The ABRI,36 the Indonesian 
acronym for Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or the Indonesian Armed Forces, 
has among the lowest rate of expenditure per capita in the region (see Table 1). The 
government found it difficult to provide the military with good facilities, better pay, and 
reasonable insurance. Therefore, the ‘Dual Function,’ so far, was the best solution for the 
Suharto administration to run the military. 
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Brunei    5.80      3100   13,120    179.8       0.24     761 
Indonesia    2.10     71960     430 1585.2   176.65         9 
Malaysia    3.20     31620   1,870  1011.8      16.91       60 
Philippines    1.30     37710      630   490.2      59.84         8 
Singapore    5.30     24010    9,100  1272.5       2.64     482 
Thailand    3.70     54550    1,000    2018.4 54.55       37 
 
Table 1. ASEAN's Military Expenditure in 1970's up to 1980's. 
Source: The Robinson Rojas Archive. 
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Economically, the Suharto administration has built a centralized system of 
control. The foreign press considered his family fortune superior to that of the ex- 
president of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos. Strategic industries in areas like oil, gas, 
communications and plantation were run by states companies controlled by ‘Suharto’s 
men’ including military personnel. Aside from these enterprises and also linked to them, 
a series of private companies are property of Suharto’s family or close associates. 
After the 1965 –1966 communist coup attempt, Suharto folded the police into the 
armed forces. The army has customarily assigned two-thirds of its soldiers to territorial or 
domestic duties, a practice that has encouraged the assumption, in the public as well as in 
the armed forces, that military involvement in the internal security is essential to stabilize 
the community. A 1997 survey found that 80 percent of rural Indonesians interviewed 
approved of some military presence in the provinces to guard against communal violence. 
Ironically, amongst the 200 million population in the 1980s, the police force has only 
180,000 members. Thus the army, roughly 200,000 personnel, was by far the largest and 
most important branch of the armed forces and reflected its dual function in society.37       
Concerning East Timor matters, shortly after the Indonesians occupied East 
Timor on December 8, 1975, the nation’s famous coffee production fell into the hands of 
Indonesian generals. For security reasons, the army thus created P.T. Denok Hernandes 
International, which monopolized the business and controlled the price of the coffee 
cultivated by the Timorese of re-lodgment camps. They provided transportation, 
salesmen, and other operations under the strict supervision of the militaries. After the 
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Denok successfully ran and the military fully secured the areas, then Suharto’s 
enterprises came one by one. The Bakrie Brothers for instance was a society of a son and 
half-brother of Suharto with a family of Arabian ascendancy, hence the company name. 
Other companies were the P.T. Nusa Bhakti owned by the wife of Suharto and P.T. 
Lianbau from his son. Furthermore, the military also brought its giant company through 
its commercial operation run by the Batara Indra Group, which held some companies and 
spread its interest through the whole island. 
E. INDONESIA’S ANNEXATION OF EAST TIMOR 
In the view of Indonesians, the dangerous situation occurred when the Portuguese 
abandoned East Timor on August 26, 1975. The Indonesian government always, and will 
always, argue that it was forced to act to prevent disaster after Portugal retreated in 1975, 
leaving a variety of factions to fight for control. One of the more radical factions, 
FRETILIN, was known for its leftist views that sounded like Communist doctrine. 
Indonesia feared civil unrest on its borders and was worried about having a Communist 
state as its neighbor. At that very time, Communists were taking over Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia. Indonesia became seriously concerned about the regional impact. Indonesia 
feared that East Timor would become a Communist client state, and that the powerful 
navy of the Soviet Union would seek a sea route linking Southeast Asian Communist 
countries to the Timor island. In the 1970s, Suharto never imagined that he was going to 
get much more than he had bargained for. For many reasons, East Timor could never be 
made an obedient child of a large Indonesian family, as espoused and expected by the 
military in the Indonesian context, simply because, by the yardstick of any trait 
language, culture, civilization, religion, ethnicity it was not related to the family for 
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more than 400 years. The Portuguese influenced the hearts and minds of many East 
Timorese. Notwithstanding repeated claims, East Timor under the FRETILIN leadership 
continued to boil and a small band of rebels prevailed over the larger and more powerful 
Indonesian troops.38 In the international context, the United Nations and many other 
nations never accepted Indonesian occupation of East Timor. The only obvious exception 
was Australia, under direct support from the United States, which formally recognized 
Indonesia’s control over East Timor.  
The dangerous situation and fear of a civil war disrupted Indonesian West Timor, 
leading Indonesia to conduct a full-scale military intervention to implement the ‘Balibo 
Declaration,’ on Sunday, December 7, 1975. However, the massive deployment of troops 
did not help Indonesia to subjugate FILANTIL, the armed wing of the pro-independence 
movement FRETILIN, whose number has grown consistently despite a high number of 
casualties in its ranks because of the growing radicalization of the post 1975 generation. 
The East Timor issue remained alive in the international fora in part because of recurrent 
incidents of atrocities and wanton killing by the Indonesian military. Amnesty 
International brought out a detailed report on widespread human rights violation by the 
Indonesian military in 1985. Many journalists reported that the Indonesian military killed 
at least 200,000 East Timorese.39 However, according to an Australian Herald Sun 
journalist, Andrew Bolt, so far the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) has discovered the bodies and fresh graves of only around 68. Of 
course, they are sure to find many more bodies, as the peacekeepers fan out into the 
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countryside. The United Nations spokesmen in East Timor said that he had no idea of 
what the final number will be.40 Therefore, the investigation on how the Indonesian 
military conducted its mission in East Timor since 1975 until now could be very difficult 
to uncover. 
In the events following the 1975 military action, East Timor continued to boil and 
a small band of rebels Indonesian called them GPK, Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan or 
the disturbance armed groups allowed themselves to be subdued by the larger and 
more powerful Indonesian troops (or TNI). Of course, this was done at enormous cost. 
Despite no official report, Amnesty International predicted a number of casualties and at 
least 200,000 men were killed or missing. The UN mission in East Timor (UNTAET) had 
difficulty empirically establishing that 200,000 East Timorese had been killed. They 
could be either missing or might have emigrated during the civil war just a couple months 
before the Indonesian military intervention. The Indonesian government claims the 
military intervention in 1975 was a political action and refused to accept the number of 
casualties as human rights abuses. The military was not ordered to kill civilians, but it 
intended to eliminate the separatist’s movement of FILANTIL (the armed wing of the 
pro-independence movement), which Indonesia considered to be the armed GPK (the 
disturbance armed groups). They were wearing civilian clothes, living in the jungles, and 
using underground networks to fight against the TNI. However, many journalists and 
reporters were irresponsibly biasing their information to convince international opinion 
that the TNI was aggressively killing civilians. It also remained under international 
scrutiny as the United Nations never accepted Indonesia’s control over East Timor. 
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Though many countries support Indonesia’s policy toward East Timor, Australia was the 
only country that formally recognized the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. 
      After the Cold War ended, the situation in East Timor was totally changed. 
The most prominent among the TNI’s actions was the November 12, 1991 incident 
between the pro-independence movement and the TNI. For the first time, an official 
inquiry was conducted by the Indonesian government, which put the death toll at 50 
(exact number unclear) resulting in the removal of two TNI generals and the court-
marshall of 10 soldiers. The end of the Cold War and mounting international pressure 
forced Indonesia to open up Indonesian policy in East Timor. However, it is important to 
understand that the TNI was reluctant to give up East Timor just because civilian political 
leaders were facing international criticism. From the viewpoint of TNI, they had 
intervened and occupied East Timor at enormous human and material cost and, hence, it 
should not be given up. Because the TNI was the backbone of Suharto, he could not 
ignore the army’s feelings.   
For Indonesia, the main reasons to occupy East Timor in 1975 were to stop the 
East Timorese civil war from widening into Indonesian West Timor since the Portuguese 
abandoned the island irresponsibly, and to anticipate infiltration by ‘unfriendly’ forces, 
the Communist movement in particular. Indonesia would never have intervened in East 
Timor if there had not been legal issues behind the conflict. Though it was never 
recognized by the UN, Indonesia was convinced by some legal arguments to occupy East 
Timor. First, the Balibo Declaration of November 30, 1975, in which all parties except 
FRETILIN declared their integration into the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the East 
Timorese Petition of May 31, 1976, a declaration of  the East Timorese chieftains and the 
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majority of the people urging the Government of Indonesian to accept and formalize an 
immediate integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Third, Law No. 7 of 1976 in which 
the Suharto administration had to accept East Timor’s integration into the Republic based 
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The question of why and how Indonesia became involved in East Timor in the 
1970s is also a large question for other countries in the world. Some of them blamed 
Indonesia, while many of them supported the Indonesian intervention in East Timor to 
maintain the stability in the region. As the height of Cold War tension and assured of 
understanding from Australian and other key western countries such as the United States, 
Indonesia was concerned about protecting its strategic interests in the event deepwater 
submarines passed through Indonesian internal waters. As long as many countries’ 
interests in that particular area remained, there would always be international issues to be 
discussed. 
 A. RESPONSE FROM THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 
As the most populace country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has been a key 
country and the founding father of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Obsessed with the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
neighboring countries, the leaders of ASEAN have uttered virtually no protest and 
instead have completely turned their backs on East Timor and its people. As witnessed 
two years after the annexation of East Timor, in 1977, ASEAN propounded the concept 
of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, yet they still respected their motto, which called for “ASEAN solidarity”41 
in facing Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. 
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The term “ASEAN way” became meaningful for the members to discuss any 
problem by not interfering in each other’s internal problems. There were concerns raised 
as to how ASEAN would or should respond to the East Timor case in the long term such 
as whether they should support possible pressure from Indonesian West Timor, or 
whether they would be prepared to facilitate reconciliation between East and West Timor. 
The risk of ‘Balkanization’42 was always in ASEAN’s mind before and after East Timor 
independence. They saw the Indonesian Aceh and Irian Jaya as a possible next test, 
which could affect negatively on the economic and political stability of fellow ASEAN 
members. 
1. Malaysia: A True Friend 
Indonesia got solid backing from the fellow members of ASEAN especially 
Malaysia. In the name of ASEAN “solidarity,” the Malaysian government had chosen to 
censure all news since 1975 about the Indonesian military intervention in East Timor, in 
order to avoid troubles with its neighbor. It was clearly evident that Indonesia received 
help from Malaysia before and after Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in December 
1975. First, the Malaysian government was trying to pressure the East Timorese by 
contacting the UDT leaders and warning them that ASEAN countries would not tolerate 
the emergence of an independent “left-wing state” in the region.43 Second, knowing that 
many countries were complaining about the origins of equipment being used by the 
Indonesian military in East Timor, Malaysia thus supplied the arms secretly to conceal 
their origin. Indonesian used that equipment to train APODETI and UDT members along 
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the border of West Timor and sent them back to East Timor to fight against FRETILIN. 
As reported by the CIA: 
Vastly increased Indonesian involvement is now proposed; special troops 
armed with weapons that cannot be traced to Jakarta will be used. 
Malaysia has reportedly agreed in principle to supply such weapons.44 
Two years after East Timor became Indonesia’s 27th province, another Malaysian 
effort to be a “good” neighbor became evident. In February 1977, the Malaysian 
government provided the Indonesian military with four ex-Royal Australian Air force 
Sabre jets as a source of spare parts for its own Sabre. This issue is now not top secret 
anymore since Australia also got involved in helping the Indonesian military intervention 
in East Timor.45 
2. The Philippines: A Friend in Need 
From the beginning of the conflict in 1975, the Philippines government was 
standing very clear away from it. The Philippines was among the 12 countries, China and 
some other Asian nations, except Japan and South Korea, which rejected any UN 
proposal regarding Indonesia-East Timor issues. From the Philippines’ viewpoint, 
Indonesia must not be humiliated or the nation could fall apart, which would then affect 
the Philippines’ internal stability.46 If East Timor became an independent country, the 
Philippine fear of separatism by its neighbor was clearly apparent.  
In addition, Jakarta helped broker a 1996 peace agreement under which another 
Filipino Muslim separatist faction, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), ended 
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its 24-year armed campaign and accepted a government offer for limited Muslim rule in 
certain areas of Mindanao. With this situation, it was difficult for the Philippine 
government to accept any of the UN resolutions about East Timor. It was better for the 
Philippines to stay away or at least abstain on every discussion about Indonesia and East 
Timor. There was a tendency for all ASEAN members, including the Philippines, to view 
the East Timor case as Indonesia’s internal problem. The Philippines government thus 
asserted:  
if East Timor is destabilized, West Timor would also be destabilized. 
Once that happens there will be a chain reaction in Indonesia. Then if 
Indonesia is involved, there will be an impact on Mindanao.47 
In the Philippines view, as well as other ASEAN members, the East Timor case 
was important for the wider region and its stability. During Indonesian occupation, if East 
Timor were able to be successful in separating from Indonesia with external support, 
other separatist movements in the region could be encouraged such as happened 
recently in the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku. 
3. Thailand: The Unclear Statement 
Thailand’s views were always changing about Indonesia-East Timor relations as 
well as Thailand’s alliances with superpowers. Alignment and alliances have always been 
an important element in the Thai elite’s approach to security.48 Based on this theory and 
its experience as a country that has never been colonized, Thai foreign policies were also 
dependent on the alliance approach. 
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In the Cold War era, knowing that The United States and other major countries 
were backing Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975, Thailand was also obsessed 
with the principle of ASEAN’s noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring 
countries. Together with other ASEAN members, the Thai government felt that, since its 
establishment in 1967, ASEAN was created not only to foster economic and political 
solidarity among Southeast Asian states, but also to reject communism as a posing a 
threat to the region.49 Therefore, when Indonesia feared the appearance of communism in 
East Timor, it was reasonable for the Thai government to vote against any of the UN 
proposals condemning Indonesia’s occupation over East Timor. The resolutions passed 
anyway. 
The situation in East Timor changed dramatically after the Cold War ended. As 
Inbaraj asserted: 
Now that the Cold War is over, another argument had to be found, and 
there is nothing better than the Yugoslavia scenario to deter involvement 
by the rest of the world…the United Nations does not recognize Jakarta’s 
rule over the [East Timor] territory and still considers Portugal the 
administration of East Timor.50  
This situation also affected Thailand’s internal situation when the eleven East 
Timorese planned to attend a non-government organization (NGO) human rights 
conference51 simultaneously with the 1994 ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok. 
However, the Thai government saw them as provocative since many of the NGO’s 
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involved were among those who helped drive out the Thai Junta in May 1992 and set the 
stage for reversion to democracy in the country, including free elections. Therefore, the 
Thai government prohibited them from even entering Thailand. 
One thing that remains the same in every ASEAN meeting after the Cold War is 
that its leaders insist non-intervention must remain ASEAN’s principle. They still 
conclude that East Timor is Indonesia’s internal problem unless the Indonesian 
government itself decides to seek help from other fellow ASEAN states. One such 
example, is in late 1999, the Transitional President B.J Habibie irresponsibly offered East 
Timor immediate independence and requested ASEAN to send as many troops as 
possible for peace-enforcement in East Timor. The ASEAN leaders than came out with a 
different interpretation as Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan said: 
East Timor has started a very very fundamental, far-reaching debate on 
how the organization will handle problems of this nature way into the 
future…It’s the beginning of a serious process of soul reaching, of how we 
are going to cooperate.52  
4. Singapore: The Wise Advisor 
Jakarta responded angrily when Singapore abstained at the United Nations vote. 
Suharto was expecting a lot of understanding from each fellow member of ASEAN 
regarding the East Timor situation. Suharto felt that as long as ASEAN stayed committed 
to supporting the Indonesian idea of occupying East Timor for regional security reasons, 
it could convince the international community positively. However, the Singapore 
Democratic Party (SDP) called on the Singapore Government under Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew to do everything they could, or to give strong and wise advice, to the 
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Indonesian counterpart in handling East Timor in a peaceful and dignified manner. Once 
Mr. Lee clarified his statement about the East Timor conflict in front of ASEAN and 
Japanese leaders: 
To be fair, East Timor is not a Southeast Asian problem. It would not have 
been a problem if it was left to Southeast Asia and Japan. It was a problem 
created by Portugal, the European Union and the human rights group in 
America and Australia…The problem started, not because of ASEAN, but 
because these other countries said: ‘Look, the East Temorese are 
unhappy.’ But there are many unhappy minorities living very 
uncomfortable in ASEAN. You know that, I know that. We look the other 
way. To go in and intervene would have the whole ASEAN solidarity 
breaking up.53 
B. RESPONSES FROM MAJOR COUNTRIES 
East Timor annexation into the Republic of Indonesia in August 1976 must be 
seen against the backdrop of a domestic as well as global political environment. By the 
early 1970s, the Soviet Union had established military parity with the United States and 
had begun to actively support Communist movements in the third world, especially in 
Africa in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, for instance. Additionally, the Soviet Union 
intervened in Afghanistan, thus, starting the second round of the Cold War. By the mid 
70s, the three countries of Indochina successfully emerged victorious, defeating the 
United States under the leadership of the Communist parties. There was a resurgence of 
leftist movements in countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. After the 
military coup in 1965, deposing President Sukarno, the Indonesian military‘s credentials 
as an anti-Communist crusader were impeccable as far as the West was concerned. It 
became obvious, based on circumstantial evidence, that there was Western compliance in 
what Indonesia did in East Timor because the FRETILIN movement was, by and large, 
 42 
considered to be leftist. Indonesia itself would not tolerate the emergence of a leftist 
country on its border. 
It was clearly convinced that a number of key Western countries were involved in 
supporting the Indonesian military intervention in East Timor in 1975. The United States, 
Britain and Australia were countries that would have paid much greater attention if East 
Timor was not falling into Communist hands. As reported by a number of journalists, the 
green light for the annexation was given by the United States President Gerald Ford and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who visited Jakarta just a day before the Indonesian 
military intervention in East Timor on December 7, 1975. This event was thus used by 
Suharto to make sure that the United States Government accepted his concept of the 
annexation of East Timor to become the 27th Indonesian province. As the United States 
did, the British also implicitly supported Indonesia by selling their weapons to the 
Indonesian military. For its part, Australian played a key role in legitimizing the East 
Timor integration into Indonesia by issuing the official statement or the so-called “ Evans 
Doctrine.”54 
1. Response from the United States  
In the United States’ view, Secretary of State Kissinger stressed that Indonesia 
had become the most advantageous trading partner. This attitude had much to do with the 
international context in the mid-1970s. The United Sates, whose own troops were 
completing their painful retreat from Indochina, was easily alarmed by the Suharto 
administration’s portrayal of FRETILIN as a communist party. The United States was 
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interested in Indonesia not only because of Indonesia’s anti-communism, but also, in geo-
political terms, the United States desired to see a fair decolonization process in East 
Timor even though it fell far short of its desire not to disrupt friendly relations with 
Jakarta. It was also important that the Americans desired to maintain US access to the 
deep-water straits running through Indonesia so that its submarines could pass undetected 
through the archipelago between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. For these reasons, many 
times before East Timor’s referenda, the United Sates always abstained from most of the 
United Nations resolutions. They also censured Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor and 
did what they could to calm down international condemnation, though the United States 
military sales to Indonesia were suspended after the Indonesian military intervention in 
East Timor. However, it resumed shortly after.55 
As one of the strongest backers of the new order regime of General Suharto after 
the Communist Party coup in 1965 that resulted in the overthrow of President Sukarno, 
the role of the United States in endorsing the Indonesian plan in occupying East Timor is 
also strongly suspect. This was mainly because of the fact that Indonesia occupied East 
Timor just a day after the United States President, Gerald Ford, left Jakarta after a short 
visit to Indonesia. It was most unlikely that Suharto would have undertaken such a move 
without implicit American support. In the situation of resurgent Communist activities 
after the Indochina victories, in any action that was based on anti-Communism, 
Washington most likely would have supported it.56 It was also clearly evident that the 
United States implicitly challenged the judgment of the United Nations about the terms of 
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Portugal remaining in East Timor as the administering power, as pointed out by the 
United States Department of State paper in 1992, “This recognizes the reality that 
Indonesia has possessed East Timor since 1975 and will not relinquish it…”57 
It was also true that “the United States understands Indonesia’s position” became 
the slogan of President Ford. He said that given a choice between East Timor and 
Indonesia, the United States had to be on the side of Indonesia. As in early 1976, the 
United States voiced its de facto recognition of Jakarta’s annexation of East Timor, 
formalized in a US State Department official statement: “In terms of the bilateral 
relations between the United States and Indonesia, we are more or less condoning the 
incursion into East Timor.”58     
Unlike Sukarno, the New Order regime under Suharto was more flexible in 
allowing large-scale foreign investment. By the 1979s, the United States was investing 
more in Indonesia than in any other Southeast Asian country. Part of that trade was arms. 
Even though the arms provided by the United States were limited strictly to self-defense, 
in Kissinger’s mind there was a difference if an independent East Timor would be a 
Communist state.59 Therefore, new arms were sent, including OV-10 counterinsurgency 
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Type In Service Type In Service 
Aircraft   Maritime Ships  
A-4 Skyhawk 28 LST 8 
F-5 E Tiger II 14 PGM-39 2 
F-16 F. Falcon 12 Submarine (Hui Class) 1* 








HU-16 4 V-150 APCs 60 
Aero Commander 6 M101 105 mm How 170 
Helicopters     
Bell 205 16   
Hughes 500 12   
 
Table 2. Major US Military Equipment Sold to Indonesian, 1992. 
 
*Operational Status Uncertain 
After Ref: [The United States Library of Congress] 
 
Today, especially after the Cold War has ended, which led to the decline in the 
United States’ military presence and the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional 
uncertainties have emerged that influence the bilateral cooperation between Washington 
and Jakarta. No more communist threat in the region seemed to be an acceptable reason 
for shifting the United States’ policies toward Indonesia. Thus, the Dili Santa Cruz 
Cemetery incident on November 12, 1991, between Indonesian forces and the East 
Timorese rioters or demonstrators, was a moment used by many human rights 
organizations to call for united support for the implementation of the UN resolution on 
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East Timor.60 Therefore, it was the first time the United States affirmed support for East 
Timor’s self-determination. 
In Indonesia’s view, the Santa Cruz incident was an act of policy. On the 
contrary, the media and reporters were exaggerating the situation by exploiting the 
Indonesian military’s aggressive action at that time. Nobody knew exactly what happened 
during the incident because the situation was uncontrollable. In fact, the incident would 
never have happened if the demonstrators did not stab two Indonesian officers with a 
knife who were trying to calm down the demonstrators.61 Testimony varied, since many 
witnesses could not clearly recall the incident. Some of them might have been biased by 
the pro-independence groups. This was not the first issue that has had biased reporting, 
exploiting the situation in East Timor, as the former US Ambassador to Indonesia, Paul 
Wolfowitz, testified about Indonesia and East Timor in front of members of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives in September 1999. He then argued, 
I sympathize with the millions of decent Indonesians who believe that 
there has been bias in reporting of events in East Timor, that pro-
independence atrocities are often not reported at all,” and then he 
implicitly explaining of why the United States shift the policy by 
asserting, “Perhaps one can say it did success in preventing in the 1970’s a 
Cuba on Indonesia’s doorstep, but there is not a threat any longer.62             
2. Response from Australia  
Until the late 1990s, Australia’s position that East Timor belonged to Indonesia 
remained unchanged. Over the years, Australia had given de facto recognition to 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. This means, although Indonesia is not an officially 
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recognized government of East Timor, Australia accepted Indonesia’s existing territory 
as a viable solution that has worked for more than 20 years. As reported in the secret 
official documents of the Australian Government, which became available in March 
1999, they indicated that the Prime Minister of Australia, Gough Whitlam, strongly 
supported Indonesia in two critical meetings with Suharto. The Australian newspaper, 
Sydney Morning Herald, which procured these documents, stated,  
He [Whitlam] affirmed, however, that he strongly desired closer and more 
cordial relations with Indonesia and would ensure that our relations with 
Indonesia were paramount important to Australia.63  
In responding to East Timor Self-determination, the Prime Minister noted in this 
regard that he was not prepared to accept at face value the claims of the political 
personalities who have currently emerged in Portuguese Timor. He also noted that they 
were predominantly drawn from the mestizo populations, they had their own economic 
interests to protect and sought to retain their European lifestyle. The Prime Minister then 
implied that they, in fact, represented a small elite class. It may be that they would be 
able to win the allegiance of the people of Timor; but their claims were yet untested.64  
a. The Evans Doctrine 
Australia played a critical role in legitimizing the Indonesian annexation 
of East Timor by advancing a new conceptual monstrosity to international law that is now 
called the “Evans Doctrine,” after the Australian Foreign Minster Gareth Evans said, “We 
recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor at the same time that we recognize the 
right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.” The Government of Australia 
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emphasized that Australia should not seek, or appear to seek, any special interests in 
Portuguese Timor. They were people with a different ethnic background, language, and 
culture. It would be unrealistic and improper if Australians were to seek some special 
relationship. They also believed that East Timor was too small to be independent. It was 
economically unviable. At the same time, the Australian Prime Minister noted that, for 
the domestic audience in Australia, incorporation into Indonesia should appear to be a 
natural process arising from the wishes of the people.65    
b. The Timor Gap Treaty       
Another significant thing that glued the relationship between Indonesia 
and Australia was the so-called “Timor Gap Treaty.” As countries that have a complex 
and long-running dispute over the right to the Timor Sea, in 1978, three years after 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, Australia decided to try a new approach to the 
problem of the Timor Sea. By declaring its support for Indonesia’s occupation of East 
Timor, Australia put itself in a strong position to negotiate the right to the Timor Gap 
with the Indonesian Authority. The negotiations took a long time until finally both 
countries signed an agreement known officially as the Treaty on a Zone of Cooperation 
between the Indonesian province of East Timor and Northern Australia. Unofficially it 
was called the Timor Gap Treaty. Both countries agreed to divide the sea into three areas. 
In the middle, it would be jointly developed, and the two governments would split the 
proceeds from leasing it out to oil companies. In the zone closer to Timor Island, 
Indonesia got control and agreed to give Australia a 10 percent fee from oil operations. 
The zone closer to Australia was under Australian control, and Indonesia got paid 10 
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percent of Australia’s revenue. In 1995, however, the renegotiation between Australia 
and Portugal was refused by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), citing that Indonesia 
does not fall under ICJ’s jurisdiction, and thus, Portugal continues to appeal the treaty.66 
c. Internationally Accepted Solution 
The Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, instructed a senior official 
to prepare a “Blue Book” relating to the United Nations in world peacekeeping 
operations. This book was designed to be presented to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1993. However, the book was opposed by the Australian National 
University since the book was drawing up a peace plan for East Timor along the lines of 
the United Nations intervention in Cambodia. Thus, the University initially set up the 
international conference on “Peacekeeping Initiatives for East Timor,” which was held in 
July 1995. In short, the result was clearly to achieve an “internationally accepted 
solution,”67 which encouraged the United Nations to establish a specific “peacebuilding” 
role for the United Nations in East Timor. On the contrary, the Evans’ Blue Book focused 
on “Cooperating for Peace” instead of peace building. In his mind, peacekeeping (or 
peace building) comes after the war, the conflict, or the civil strife and is designed to 
prevent lapse into war. In the case of East Timor, he then argued, it comes after the 
United Nations body failed to act on its own resolutions. Therefore, the issues of the 
United Nations failures in East Timor were also unofficially called the “evolutionary” 
                                                 
66 Carey and Bentley, pp. 73-85. 
67 The Internationally Acceptable Solution was firstly proposed by the UN Secretary General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar in the 1984, 1985, and 1986 sessions of General Assembly, which agreed to defer 
discussion of the East Timor question pending submission of reports by the Secretary General on talks 
between the Portuguese and Indonesian governments as specified in the 1983 General Assembly resolution. 
Geoffrey C. Gunn, East Timor and the United Nations: the Case for Intervention, p. 41. 
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shift in priorities on East Timor on the part of the United Nations from self-determination 
to humanitarian issues.68                 
3. Other Supporters  
During the Cold War, Indonesia got much support from the Western block in East 
Timor  rather than the Eastern block. Suharto realized that without western support he 
could not intervene too much in East Timor. Although they condemned the Indonesian 
military intervention in East Timor, many state-actors remained good trading partners. 
Since 1967, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of donor 
countries, supplied billions of dollars in grants and bank credits to the Indonesian 
government. Countries such Britain, Canada, and Japan, the Netherlands, and Germany 
were among the biggest contributors to Indonesia in the 1970s. After the Cold War 
ended, Suharto disbanded the IGGI in early 1992 when some of the donor countries tried 
to link aid to human rights. Suharto than established something else called the 
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), chaired by the World Bank.   
a. Britain         
After the annexation in 1976, Britain abstained from all eight votes on 
East Timor in the UN General Assembly, and continued to sell arms to Indonesia. As a 
major investor in Indonesia, the British government also sold eight British-made Hawk 
ground attack jets in 1978, two years after Indonesia’s occupation in East Timor. Britain 
continued to sell arms for the next two decades, including licensing 40 more Hawk 
aircraft to Jakarta. In addition to being one of Indonesia’s top weapons suppliers, Britain 
until recently was also Indonesia’s second largest foreign investor after Japan.  British 
                                                 
68 McGuinn, pp. 83-85. 
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investment in Indonesia was reported to be over US$ 30 billion since 1967, mostly in oil 
and chemical industries.69     
b. Canada 
As Britain did, Canada also abstained from voting on the first five UN 
General Assembly resolutions on East Timor, and voted No on the last three. As 
described in the previous paragraphs, Suharto was convinced by the major countries in 
the East Timor cases. From his point of view, as long as the major countries voted against 
the UN resolutions for East Timor, he then felt very sure that East Timor’s integration 
was an act of policy. From the Canadian point of view, Indonesia has consistently been 
among the top recipients of Canada’s direct, country-to-country aid, receiving CDN$ 35 
million in 1996-97.70 
In terms of arms sales, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had decided to sell 
weapons to Indonesia following a meeting with Suharto five months before Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor. Although it was halted in 1992 as a follow up to the Santa 
Cruz incident, it resumed under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in 1993. In addition, 
Chrétien also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Indonesia in 1994 as part of 
the first step toward technology transfer.71         
c. Japan 
In the East Timor case, Japan’s stand was very clear. Japan voted against 
all UN General Assembly resolutions on East Timor from 1975 to 1982. In Japan’s view, 
as asserted by Jardine, East Timor, a tiny half-island with relatively few resources, can 
                                                 
69 Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, pp. 52-67. 
70 Ibid, pp. 48-49. 
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scarcely compete with what Indonesia has to offer. Jardine then argues that a diplomatic 
white paper from the Japanese government made it quite clear how important Indonesia 
had become to Japan’s future: 
Indonesia has a strong, mutually dependent relation with Japan through 
provision of oil and natural gas and acceptance of direct investment. And 
Indonesia is a very important country for Japan because it is located in an 
area with important international sea routes and because it has political 
influence in Southeast Asia.72 
Unlike the other major countries, Japan does not contribute arms sales to 
Indonesia, per Article 9 of Japan’s constitution on Japan’s commitment to use their arms 
only for self-defense purposes. However, in economic terms, Japan was the second 
largest foreign investor in Indonesia in 1975, and now is the largest.   
 C. THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE INDONESIAN MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR. 
From 1975 to 1982, the UN voted every year on Indonesia’s takeover of 
East Timor. And each time, the organization passed a resolution 
condemning the occupation and calling for a vote of self-determination. In 
every UN vote, however, Indonesia gained a bit more support. In 1975 
only nine countries sided with Indonesia. By 1982, 46 countries had taken 
Indonesia’s side.73 
The question is why did the UN react very slowly in every conflict in the world? 
The quick answer is simply because the UN is too weak to enforce anything against any 
state or person found guilty. Public international law cannot be enforced by the same 
methods used in municipal law because of the nature of the parties involved. Based on 
this argument, the lack of a clearly defined legal system, especially in regards to state 
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jurisdiction, to decide on the basis of established principle of law is considered one of the 
weaknesses of the international legal system, which could affect UN decisions.74  
Soon after Indonesia’s military intervention in December 7, 1975, the United 
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution asking Indonesia to withdraw its armed 
forces from East Timor immediately, and upheld the East Timorese people’s right of self-
determination. The vote was 72 to 10, with 43 abstentions, including the United States, 
Canada, and most Western European nations.75 The on going vote always leaned heavily 
towards the Indonesian side. During the Cold War, this situation was not unusual since 
Indonesia was considered to be an ‘ally’ for the Western block. Therefore, for the 
Western side, Indonesia is too big to disappoint, especially in terms of the balance of 
power in the region they called “the Southeast Asian Tiger.”76  
1. Analysis of the Vote of UN Resolution on East Timor 
The United Nations had repeatedly condemned Indonesia’s military intervention 
in East Timor since 1975, and decided to keep East Timor on the list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories of the General Assembly. Despite the repeated condemnation by 
the United Nations, assured that major countries backed Indonesia’s annexation over East 
Timor, the Indonesian government kept controlling the territory throughout the years, 
which expressively illustrates both the UN’s strengths and its weaknesses. This section 
will analyze the votes of the UN Resolution enacted from 1975 to 1982 summarized from 
Geoffrey C. Gunn’s documents.77    
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a. General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX) 
The Vote of Resolution 3485 was held on December 12,1975, which 
focused on: (1) Recognizing the inalienable right of all people to self-determination and 
independence with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its 
resolution 1514 (XV) of the 14 December 1960;  (2) Request the Government of Portugal 
to continue its cooperation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to 
implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and People and request the Committee to send a fact-finding mission to the 
Territory as soon as possible, in consultation with the political parties in Portuguese 
Timor and the Government of Portugal. The result of this resolution was: 72 agree, 9 
against, and 43 abstain. 
b. Resolution 31/53 
The resolution 31/53 of 1976 emphasized (1) Recalling its resolution 3485 
(XXX) of 12 December 1975 and Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) of 22 
December 1975 and 389 (1976) of 22 April 1976; (2) Deciding to include in the 
provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled “Question of East Timor.” 
The result was: 68 agree, 20 against, and 49 abstain.  
c. Resolution 32/34 
The Resolution 32/34 was voted on November 28, 1977, which (1) 
Recalling its resolutions 3484 (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/53 of 12 December 
1976 and Security Council resolutions 304(1975) of 22 December 1975 and 389 (1976) 
of 22 April 1976; (2) Rejecting the claim that East Timor has been integrated into 
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Indonesia in as much as the people of the Territory have not been able to exercise freely 
their right to self-determination and independence. Vote result: 67 agree, 26 against, and 
47 Abstain. 
d. Resolution 33/39 
This Resolution was voted on December 13, 1978, which focused on (1) 
Recalling its resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/53 of 1 December 1976 
and 32/34 of 28 November 1977 and Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) of 22 
December 1975 and 389 (1976) of 22 April 1976; (2) Requesting  the Special Committee 
on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on Granting of 
Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep the situation in the Territory 
under active consideration, to follow the implementation of the present resolution, to 
dispatch to the Territory as soon as possible a visiting mission with a view to the full and 
speedy implementation of the declaration and to report thereon to the General Assembly 
at its thirty-fourth session. The result was: 59 agree, 31 against, and 44 abstain.  
e. Resolution 34/40 
This resolution was focused on (1) Declaring that the people of East Timor 
must be enabled freely to determine their own future, under the auspices of the United 
Nations; (2) Requesting the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Offices of the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees to render, within their respective fields of 
competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children 
and those seeking leave for another country for purpose of family reunion; (3) Requesting 
the Secretary General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report 
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thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. This was held on November 
21, 1979 and the result was: 62 agree, 31 against, and 45 abstain. 
f. Resolution 35/27 
The purpose of this resolution, held on November 11, 1980, was: (1) 
Welcoming the diplomatic initiative by the Portuguese Government as a first step 
towards the free exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-determination 
and independence, and urges all parties directly concerned to cooperate fully of the 
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); (2) Requesting the World Food Program, the 
UNICEF, and the UNHCR to render, within their respective fields of competence, all 
possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children. The result was: 
57 agree, 29 against, and 39 abstain. 
g. Resolution 36/50 
The vote of this resolution attempted to (1) Recall the communiqué of the 
Council of Ministers of Portugal, issued on 12 September, in which the administering 
Power pledged to undertake broad initiatives with a view to ensuring the full and speedy 
decolonization of East Timor; (2) Declare that the people of East Timor must be enabled 
freely to determine their own future on the basis of the relevant General Assembly 
resolutions and internationally accepted procedures; (3) Call upon all interested parties, 
namely Portugal, as the administering Power, and the representatives of the East 
Timorese people, as well as Indonesia, to cooperate fully with the United Nations with a 
view to guaranteeing the full exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of 
East Timor, which resulted: 57 agree, 35 against, and 37 abstain. 
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h. Resolution 37/30 
With this resolution, Indonesia was trying to seek international support 
through its diplomatic channel in order to eliminate the East Timor issue on the UN 
agenda. This resolution itself stressed: (1) Requesting the Secretary General to initiate 
consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for 
achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem and to report thereon to the General 
Assembly at its thirty-eighth session; (2) Calling upon all specialized agencies and other 
organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the World Food Program, the 
UNICEF, and UNHCR immediately to assist, within their respective fields of 
competence, the people of East Timor, in close consultation with Portugal, as 
administering Power. The result was: 49 agree, 41 against, and 45 abstain. 
When the UN General Assembly vote of 1982 with 49 in favor, 41 against, and 45 
abstentions, the motion instructed the UN Secretary General to initiate consultations with 
all concerned parties in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement of East Timor 
issues. Starting from 1983, the General Assembly surprisingly agreed to defer discussion 
of the East Timor question on talks between the Portuguese and Indonesian government 
only instead of voting on the General Assembly resolution, as witnessed in the 1984, 
1985, and 1986 sessions of talks.            
In the international context, a close look at individual countries’ votes shows that 
their behavior at the United Nations was part of a much larger pattern of support for 
Indonesia. The UN resolution from 1975 to 1982 became significant for the international 
community to judge whether the United Nations was strong enough or failed to apply its 
resolution in the East Timor cases. However, as described in previous sections, Indonesia 
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always got a little bit support especially form Western or Western-aligned countries as 
illustrated in Table 3. Therefore, Indonesia had never given up until finally President 
Habibie irresponsibly gave the people of East Timor independence.  
Country 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 
Australia Y A A N N N N N 
France  A A A A A A A A 
India N N N N N N N N 
Italy A A A A A A A A 
Japan N N N N N N N N 
Malaysia N N N N N N N N 
Netherlands A A A A A A A A 
New Zealand A A A A N N N N 
Philippines N N N N N N N N 
Saudi Arabia N N N N N N N N 
Thailand N N N N N N N N 
Turkey A N N N N N N N 
U.A.E. Y A A A A A N N 
U.K.  A A A A A A A A 
U.S.S.R. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
U.S.A. A N N N N N N N 
Singapore A N N N N N N N 
W. Germany A A A A A A A A 
China Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 3. Selected Countries in UN General Assembly Votes on East Timor. 
Source: ETAN. 
 
2. Analysis of UN Involvement in East Timor 
Historically, the United Nations involvement in East Timor is to complete the 
process of decolonization that started some forty years ago. The process itself has gone 
through three time periods. First, the period of 1945-1975, the final Portuguese rule, 
which reached its crisis in 1975. The second was the 1975-1999 period when East Timor 
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was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia. The last period is the transition to 
independence under United Nations administration.    
a. The First Process of Decolonization, 1945-1975  
The United Nations got involved in East Timor officially after Portugal 
joined the UN in 1955. Five years later, the General Assembly adopted a resolution of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People. Portugal 
was the target of this resolution. Thus, in 1960, the General Assembly placed East Timor 
on the international agenda  
The Government of Portugal recognized the UN Charter on non-self-
governing territories and Portugal also wanted to be rid quickly of its six colonies, 
including East Timor. However, colonial officials considered that East Timor was not 
viable as an independent state, and they even considered supporting the option of 
integration into Indonesia.78 The Portugal Governor Lemos Pires, finally, withdrew from 
East Timor and neither transferred power nor completed the process of decolonization. 
b. The Second Attempt of Decolonization, 1975-1999  
From the point of view of the people of East Timor, the period after 1975 
was called the new period of colonization. The UN thus called upon all states to respect 
the inalienable right of the people of East Timor through the resolution summarized in the 
previous section. The UN also called upon the Government of Indonesia to respond 
immediately to the UN General Assembly resolutions. However, realizing that many 
countries voted against or at least abstained from almost all resolutions, the Government 
of Indonesia decided to seek a different course of action and still felt the integration of 
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East Timor into the Republic was the best option. Therefore, the situation developed 
internationally and reached some negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal until they 
finally reached the agreement. 
(1) Negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal.  Based on the 
resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982, both parties achieved a comprehensive settlement 
of the problem. Tripartite talks thus took place several times starting in 1982, 1992, 1994, 
and 1997 between Indonesia, Portugal, and sometimes with the representative of the 
people of East Timor under UN auspices, but East Timor remained an unresolved 
problem throughout the 1990s until finally President Habibie changed Indonesia’s stance 
on East Timor as indicated in June 1998.79 (This will be described also in the next 
chapter)     
(2) The 5 May Agreement.  The 5 May agreement was basically 
the fundamental shift in Indonesia’s position on East Timor. In this agreement, Indonesia 
and Portugal under the United Nations set out the process for a popular consultation by 
ballot on whether the people of East Timor would accept or reject the proposed 
constitutional framework for autonomy. Indonesia and Portugal would agree to whatever 
the people of East Timor chose and agreed to transfer autonomy in East Timor to the 
United Nations in the transition period. However, in article 3 of the agreement, the 
Government of Indonesia was given the responsibility of maintaining peace and security 
before, during, and after the ballot.  
                                                 




c. The UN and the Transitional Government  
The year 1999 saw another new change in East Timorese history. As a 
consequence of the May 5 Agreement, the UN Security Council established the United 
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) based on Resolution 1246, 11 June, 1999, which held 
the mandate from the UN to organize and conduct a popular consultation on autonomy 
within Indonesia or for Independence. On the polling day, the UNAMET was able to 
register 451, 792 voters, and 98 percent of those registered cast a vote. The result was a 
majority, or 78.5 percent voted for independence. 
After the ballot, the Transitional Government then worked together with 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to establish the 
embryo of the new nation. Both institutions gradually set up the thirty-three members of 
the new Council. However, both institutions never asked the pro-integration’s opinion on 
joining the reconciliation. About 200,000 people voted for integration into Indonesia.  
Therefore, they remained a source of resistance for this period.      
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
As a result of the UN General Assembly resolutions from 1975 to 1982, it could 
be seen that Indonesia gained more support from the international community. Although 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor was bound basically by two Security Council 
resolutions, 384 (22 December 1975), 389 (1976) and one General Assembly resolution 
34 85 (22 December 1975), to facilitate East Timor’s self determination, to withdraw its 
occupation forces, and to facilitate the role of the UN Secretary General to bring together 
all parties concerned to achieve the decolonization of the territory. However, Indonesia 
always ignored every single UN resolution. Knowing that many countries support 
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Indonesia in the UN vote for the resolutions, Jakarta then pushed itself to assure its 
supporters in eliminating East Timor from the UN agenda and full recognition of the 
integration of East Timor into Indonesia. With the support from major countries, 
Indonesia had almost attained its goals. Despite the security reasons, major countries took 
the position that Indonesia was important politically and economically. Nevertheless, the 
situation is now changing. The post-Cold War era shows that Indonesia is not important 
anymore, especially for western powers. Thus, the next chapter will try to describe how 
the Indonesian regime lost its power, the economic crisis, and more aspects that link to 
the East Timor case.              
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IV. THE INDONESIAN VIEW OF PROPAGANDA WAR IN EAST 




As explained in the previous chapter, with the support of Australia, the United 
States, and ASEAN at the time of heightened Cold War tension, the Indonesian military 
generals laid plans for East Timor’s incorporation. Indonesia attempted to keep the 
conflict as low as possible. Initially, it was hoped that this might be finessed through an 
intelligence operation called the ‘Komodo Operation.’80 It was designed to fit the 
domestic political situation in East Timor in such a way that the Indonesian military 
would never have intervened unless East Timorese leaders ‘invited’ them to do so. 
Meanwhile the Indonesian military leaders were also denouncing FRETILIN as a 
Communist threat. Therefore, an integrated East Timor seemed to be the only solution, 
especially for security purposes. 
Diplomatically, Jakarta had a long way to go to eliminate East Timor from the 
UN’s agenda. From 1976 to 1982, the United Nations adopted resolutions each year 
demanding that Indonesian troops be withdrawn and give the right of self-determination 
to the people of East Timor. A series of talks between Indonesia and Portugal, under 
United Nations auspices, were arranged to find an internationally acceptable solution. 
However the discussion was never ended. Somehow, Indonesia was accusing Portugal of 
abandoning East Timor without restoring power to the local government or one of the 
party leaders. It was stated that Portugal delayed issuing the constitution of the final 
                                                 
80 The existence of this operation, code named ‘Operasi Komodo’ or the Giant Lizard Operation, 
became known to The United States  and Australian intelligence agencies before the year was out. Its aim 
was to bring about the integration of East Timor by whatever means necessary. Carey, p. 62.  
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Portuguese withdrawal until October 1978. Having an unclear situation, a civil war broke 
out among parties in East Timor. It was a dilemma for Indonesia on whether to get 
involved or not in an East Timor civil war. By September 1975, FRETILIN controlled all 
of East Timor except for a few villages close to the West Timor border. The brief civil 
war had cost some 3,000 Timorese lives, including the UDT and APODETI leaders,81 
and forced thousands more to flee into West Timor. 
After the Cold War ended, though the East Timor problem continued to simmer, it 
could not be settled as long as Suharto was in power. When B.J. Habibie took over after 
Suharto was forced to leave office in May 1998, he promised to reduce the number of 
troops in East Timor. Nevertheless, no one took Habibie seriously, as he was handpicked 
by Suharto to be his deputy. Additionally, following a series of negotiations, Habibie 
offered the option of independence to East Timor in January 1999, triggering a renewed 
out break of fighting in East Timor between pro-integrationists and pro-independence 
backers. This chapter, therefore, will analyze the process of international intervention in 
East Timor starting from the legal issue, humanitarian effort, Indonesia’s diplomatic 
efforts in East Timor, political and economic crisis in Indonesia, and the domino effect of 
the East Timor crisis in Indonesia. 
A. LEGAL ISSUES: INDEPENDENCE VERSUS INTEGRATION  
It was clear that the 1975 Indonesian military intervention violated international 
law and the right of self-determination. The United Nations Security Council condemned 
the use of force in East Timor, and the General Assembly rejected Indonesia’s annexation 
                                                 
81 An interview of eyewitnesses during the FRETILIN brutality in 1975, as converted to Eanglish, 
they said, “Ramos Horta was a key-person who planned the genocide in Ailue, Maubesi, and Same. A 
number of UDT and APODETI leaders were caught and murdered by the FRETILIN. Online http:// 
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of East Timor under the various resolutions summarized in the previous chapter. 
However, many scholars argue that the United Nations is nearly powerless as an abstract 
entity or even as a representative of the world’s nations. It can act, instead, only insofar 
as it is given authorization by the great powers. 
As reported by Noam Chomsky, the United Nations has no standing peacekeeping 
forces and thus is dependent on finding countries willing to contribute troops for any 
particular mission. The organization suffers as well from an extreme shortage of funds 
because of the continual US refusal to pay its dues. The United States no doubt plays a 
key role in the UN Security Council. Some organs of the United Nations, such as the 
General Assembly or its bodies, are mostly Third World countries dealing with economic 
and social issues ever since the era of decolonization. Accordingly, US policy has been to 
undermine and marginalize the United Nations, which should have an important role in 
world affairs. U.S. policy and the policies of other major states severely limit the 
international organization. From the United States point of view, however, it serves as a 
convenient tool of its interest even when something goes wrong. Thus, the East Timor 
case is directly attributable to the refusal of the United States and other Western powers 
to deter the atrocities there over a period of a quarter century, yet the UN will probably 
take the blame.82  
1. The Act of Self-Determination 
a. The UN Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
In the post-World War II years, anti-colonialism spread through the world, 
and resolutions criticizing colonialism became commonplace in every UN meeting. In 
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response, Portugal changed East Timor’s status from a colony to an overseas province. 
However, the United Nations did not accept the change of status. Later, through UN 
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the UN urged Portugal to let the East 
Timorese determine their own status, but Portugal never conducted a public vote on the 
subject until the crisis came in 1975. This also showed the powerlessness of the UN to 
enforce its own resolutions. 
b. The Rome Memorandum                    
On the international front, the fact that civil war broke out after the 
Portuguese Governor abandoned East Timor without restoring order was ignored by the 
international community, except in Indonesia and Portugal. The Indonesian government 
suggested a meeting with Portuguese officials on the condition that neither East Timor 
nor the UN be involved in the negotiations. On November 3, 1975, Indonesia and 
Portugal issued a document known as the ‘Rome Memorandum of Understanding.’ In 
that memorandum, Indonesia acknowledged Portugal as East Timor’s administering 
authority and urged the Portuguese to end the [civil war] fighting. However, FRETILIN 
refused to acknowledge the memorandum and chose to act as an independent. Thus, 
FRETILIN continued to control Dili along with the on-going civil war between parties.83   
c. The FRETILIN Declaration of Independent 
The refusal of the Portuguese administration to return and the growing 
danger from Indonesia hastened the FRETILIN’s decision to declare independence. The 
Democratic Republic of East Timor was proclaimed on November 28, 1975.84 
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FRETILIN’s desperate move was intended to enable East Timor to issue a direct appeal 
to the international community for action by the United Nations to halt Indonesian 
intervention. However, FRETILIN’s unilateral declaration of independence was rejected 
by both Portugal and Indonesia. Only a few former Portuguese colonies in Africa 
recognized independence. The rest of the world and the UN in particular never 
recognized FRETILIN’s independence of East Timor.    
d. Resistance and the 1999 Referendum 
Knowing its forces were powerless compared with the Indonesian forces, 
FRETILIN then existed as a resistance to ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces, now renamed 
TNI). It established an underground movement without an internationally recognized 
leader. While this situation was exploited by those opposing the Timorese people’s right 
to self-determination, the perception of FILANTIL, the armed wing of FRETILIN, began 
to change in 1983 when a document published in Lisbon revealed that leadership had 
passed into the hands of one of the members of FRETILIN central committee, Jose 
Xanana Gusmao. Though the numbers kept dropping and Xanana was captured by the 
ABRI on November 20, 1992,85 FILANTIL kept resisting the ABRI’s movement and 
influencing East Timor people to demand their right of self-determination. 
On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement under UN 
auspices to execute a referendum offering the choice of autonomy or independence. This 
happened after President Habibie surprisingly announced that a referendum was possible 
to decide the future of East Timor in January 1999. He had to do this to safeguard his 
presidency. With political and economic uncertainty, it was impossible for Indonesia to 
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hold onto East Timor. In addition, external pressure also continued to mount, blaming 
Indonesia for committing ‘wrong doing’ in East Timor. For the first time, the referendum 
on the self-determination of East Timor was held on August 30, 1999. The result was 
surprisingly 78.5 percent of the voters for independence. 
2. The Act of Integration  
a. Balibo Declaration  
In responding to the FRETILIN declaration of independence, which was 
rejected by most of the international community, just two days after the FRETILIN 
declaration, the four other parties announced East Timor integration with Indonesia. The 
Declaration itself took place on November 30, 1975 in the town of Balibo, which became 
the Indonesian official document called the ‘Balibo Declaration of November 30, 1975.’ 
In that declaration, the four parties proclaimed that: 
We the people of Portuguese Timor, who are represented by APODETI-
Associacao Popular Democradca de Timor, UDT-Uniao Democratica de 
Timor, KOTA-Klibur Oan Timur Aswain, and the party of 
TRABALISTA, after a long and thorough consideration of the unilateral 
action of FRETILIN in making “Proclamation of Independence” for the 
territory of Portuguese Timor…[call for the reasons] In the name of the 
one God, and with the reasons given above, we respectfully declare the 
integration of all ex-Portuguese colonial areas in Timor into the Nation of 
Indonesia. This proclamation is the most truthful wish of the people of 
Portuguese Timor.86           
The FRETILIN in response declared war, and threatened to kill all other 
parties’ supporters. More than 3,000 men were believed to a have been killed by the 
FRETILIN. This was the dilemma for the Indonesian military on whether to intervene or 
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not. This also showed the slow reaction of the international community, the UN in this 
case, to respond to the mass murders by FRETILIN. 
b. East Timorese Petition 
Fearing that civil war would break out in Indonesian West Timor, the 
Indonesian authority thus made a political statement by launching military intervention 
into East Timor on December 7, 1975. The government center in Dili then fell to the 
coalition forces who formed the Provisional Government of East Timor, chaired by 
Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, and consisting of administration officials and regional 
representatives (tribal chiefs, monarchs, leaders of religious communities, and parties 
representatives). Together, they aimed to restore a working government in the region, 
absent since the Portuguese had left. The Provisional Government was charged with East 
Timor’s administration pending a self-determination process. 
During the integration campaign, Indonesia believed that an immediate 
referendum would be unrealistic and undemocratic due to over a 90 percent illiteracy rate 
among the East Timor people. The Government of Indonesia felt that it could not be 
expected to initialize proceedings until stability and widespread literacy was established. 
In addition, the people themselves were still recovering from an ongoing civil war. A 
referendum in such a potentially explosive situation would only lead to more violence. 
Surprisingly, on May 31, 1976, the newly created East Timor parliament issued the East 
Timorese Petition urging that the Government of Indonesia accept and formalize an 
immediate integration of East Timor with Indonesia, a follow up to the Balibo 
Declaration. However, Portugal never recognized this situation but the petition was 
accepted by the Indonesian government anyway. 
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c. The Law No. 7 of 1976 
To formalize the petition, following the East Timorese Provisional 
Government meeting with the United Nations Secretary General, the Provisional 
Government then delivered a petition requesting a formal integration with Indonesia to 
President Suharto in Jakarta on June 7, 1976. This occasion was described by Suharto as 
a meeting of two siblings long separated by colonialism. He also asserted that integration 
between the two peoples needed to be carried out legally through due process. Therefore, 
the Government of Indonesia proposed a bill calling for East Timor’s integration with 
Indonesia and the establishment of the province of East Timor. The bill was passed in the 
Indonesian parliament on July 15, 1976, and was formally accepted by the administration 
the following day. On July 17, Suharto signed Law No.7 of 1976 formalizing East 
Timor’s integration into Indonesia as the 27th province.87 This law would not change until 
President Habibie issued a statement giving the East Timorese a chance to be 
independent through a referendum held on August 30, 1999.   
B. INDONESIA’S DIPLOMATIC EFFORT ON EAST TIMOR 
As emphasized in the prologue of this chapter, Indonesia was trying to solve the 
East Timor problem as peacefully as possible through diplomatic effort by proposing the 
agreement. Talks between Indonesian and Portuguese delegations under UN auspices 
took place to find a reasonable solution to the East Timor long dispute. The underlying 
spirit of the agreement constituted an achievement in resolving the conflict. In 1986 and 
1991 talks, the attempt to achieve a solution was sought through sending missions to East 
Timor followed by debates and the tabling of a draft resolution or decision in the United 
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Nations General Assembly. This type of solution has been altered which was a major 
proposition or namely the concept of wide-ranging autonomy in East Timor that gave a 
new dimension to the solution of the question. This was brought to the negotiation table, 
and needed to be understood well because wide-ranging autonomy was a solution that 
would bring about a major change in the political structure in East Timor.  
The debates took a long time since Portugal did not put the East Timor issue on its 
priority list in every international level meeting until 1982. However, Indonesia agreed to 
the appeal by the UN Secretary General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, to start a dialogue 
with Portugal under the general mandate of the Secretary General. The purpose was to 
find a peaceful, comprehensive, and internationally acceptable solution through dialogue 
rather than through the continuing debate in the General Assembly. In addition, this 
dialogue was also an Indonesian effort to seek the best solution from the international 
community. Although Portugal was concerned by the Indonesian conduct of human rights 
in East Timor, Portugal also felt the sense of guilt in abandoning East Timor after having 
held it for hundreds of years.88   
In an international context, in every on-going talk between Indonesia and 
Portugal, Indonesia always received support from some major countries and fellow 
ASEAN members. A cablegram published in the New York Times on January 28, 1976 
had the United States ambassador to the UN, Daniel Moynihan, applauding the 
considerable progress made by US strategy at the UN toward basic foreign-policy goals. 
He dealt specifically with the General Assembly vote on East Timor in December 1976. 
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The United States President, Ronald Reagan, used this basic idea during his visit to 
Jakarta in April 1986. He claimed that, ‘No nation has pursued the goal of independence 
in a more responsible manner than Indonesia,’ while Secretary of State Shultz claimed 
about East Timor, ‘There has been a considerable amount of progress over the years’. 
From then on, American officials tried to influence international opinion to consider East 
Timor as a bilateral issue between Indonesia and Portugal rather than a case of 
decolonization: ‘East Timor is an issue which should be solved between Portugal and 
Indonesia, without outside interference,’ concluded the United States Ambassador on a 
visit to Lisbon in February 1987.89 Thus, Suharto was willing to resolve the dispute with 
the Portuguese Government because he realized he was not alone. 
From the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, Indonesia received more support from 
many countries. In such a scenario, Portugal reluctantly accepted de facto integration of 
East Timor into Indonesia. However, the Portuguese Government would conclude an 
agreement with Indonesia, which accepted the fait accompli, but secured guarantees from 
the military to respect human rights, permit religious freedom, and preserve East Timor’s 
cultural identity. This would then be supported by other nations, especially the European 
Community (EC), who would join the majority of governments in removing the East 
Timor issue from the UN agenda.90   
C. SUHARTO’S REGIME LOST LEGITIMACY, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY MATTERS 
It was inevitable that the dominant issue in Indonesian politics in Indonesia in the 
early 1990s would be who would succeed Suharto as president. In other Southeast Asian 
                                                 
89 Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, pp. 169-171. 
 73 
states, a change of presidency might not be as significant as in Indonesia. Suharto and his 
loyalists have exercised a strict and tight system of control over Indonesian politics for 
about 25 years. Militarily, Suharto has skillfully played off one armed forces faction 
against another in maintaining his rule. Politically, cadres that reshaped political parties 
in the military image while at the same time restructuring the apparatus of the 
government to ensure a majority for the military. Economically, the president had 
similarly built up a system of centralized control in which his family and his loyalists 
played a predominant role. Major strategic industries in areas such as oil, gas, 
communications, and plantations were run by state companies controlled by Suharto 
loyalists. Alongside these companies were private companies owned by the Suharto 
family or its close associates. Therefore, when Suharto fell, the enterprises collapsed as 
well, and many of his associates are now jailed on charges of corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism. 
1. Suharto and the Military 
During the 32 years of President Suharto's autocratic rule, the military and civil 
arms of the government were so inextricably linked as to be nearly indistinguishable. The 
military enjoyed patronage and protection from President Suharto, himself a former 
general. It also played a dominant political role under a doctrine known as "dual 
function." Now however, the military finds itself answering to a democratically elected 
civilian government. While everyone seems to agree on the need for military reform, no 
one seems quite sure of how to go about it. 
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During the military campaign in East Timor, Suharto used a common propaganda 
strategy, in which he used military generals to exercise his propaganda strategy. As 
identified by Matsuno in the ‘East Timor Question’ book, there were four basic analyses 
of Indonesian propaganda about East Timor: Communist phobia, paternalism and an 
attitude of ‘they don’t know what they are doing,’ insistence on ‘development’ rather 
than self-determination, and preoccupation with the ‘disintegration’ of Indonesia. From 
all of this propaganda, communist phobia was a central theme used by the Indonesian 
Central Intelligence Board (BAKIN or Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Indonesia) and the 
elements of Indonesian Armed Forces to launch the Komodo Operation.91  
During his more than 30 years of authoritarian rule, former President Suharto 
gave the military great liberty to act, eventually allowing it to become the single most 
powerful group in national politics. No political party, civil organization or institution 
dared to challenge the military for fear of repression. However, with the end of the 
Suharto era, the military's dominance is now being questioned, especially the doctrine of 
"dwi-fungsi" - or dual-functions. Under this doctrine, the military had been permitted to 
involve itself in all aspects of Indonesia's domestic political affairs, from the smallest 
village to the cabinet and the parliament.   
As a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Jakarta, Rizal Sukma, says that during the Suharto years dwi-fungsi had always been part 
of the Indonesian army's military doctrine, but he says it was not as far-reaching as some 
people believed. The military would engage in non-military activities, he says, but not 
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necessarily in political activities. He then adds, dwi-fungsi as an official doctrine has now 
been abandoned, but that does not mean that the military's power is greatly diminished.92 
Since Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president in 1999, Indonesia has entered a 
new era of civilian government, but many people are now debating what role the military 
will have in the country's new political environment. Many analysts argue that in reality, 
the military is still powerful, especially because civilians are not yet in firm control of the 
country. In this situation, it will be very difficult to establish a civilian supremacy vis-à-
vis the military that has been in politics since 1945. 
The military is now under intense domestic and international scrutiny over past 
human rights abuses. A government-appointed panel has accused General Wiranto, the 
former Chief of Armed Forces, and other top commanders of complicity in the violence 
that erupted in East Timor following the August 1999 referendum in the territory for 
independence. However, according to the National Committee of Human Rights 
(KOMNAS HAM) for the East Timor case, General Wiranto is not on the list of their 
investigation. This case shows that the military is still an ‘untouchable’ institution.93 
2. Economic Crisis Link to the East Timor Case 
In Indonesia’s view, East Timor’s disintegration tends to be the result of the on-
going economic crisis in the region. As described by Hadi Soesastro, President Suharto 
showed a great reluctance to implement the agreement with the IMF, which increased the 
uncertainty in the markets about Indonesia’s ability to overcome the crisis. Finally, 
Suharto was forced to resign in April 1998. Many economic analysts argued that the 
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disintegration of Indonesia is the main factor in the security structure of Indonesia, or 
even the whole region. Therefore, the separation of East Timor has aroused similar 
sentiments in other parts of Indonesia, especially in terms of economic revenues between 
the central and local or province governments (described later in the domino effect sub-
section).94     
With the Suharto regime weakened, the Portuguese government recognized new 
opportunities. In 1997, Portugal began an intense campaign through the United Nations, 
in collaboration with the leadership of the East Timorese independence movements, to 
get the East Timor issue back on the agenda. Recognizing Portuguese and European 
pressure, the UN thus appointed a special envoy Jamsheed Marker for East Timor to 
organize talks between Indonesia and Portugal. In April 1998, with the Suharto regime 
looking increasingly down, the National Council for Timor Resistance (CNRT) was 
formed at a congress in Portugal, bringing together the rival organizations and electing 
Xanana Gusmao as their supreme leader, even though he was still in an Indonesian jail 
since he was captured by the Indonesian military for violating the Indonesian subversion 
law.  
With the end of the Cold War, the international situation was also changing. The 
United States, and the major countries in particular, discovered that the Suharto regime 
no longer served its interests as it had in the past. Especially, the domination of the 
Indonesian economy by the Suharto family and those most closely associated with the 
military was becoming an obstacle to the activities of US corporations. Therefore, the 
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Asian economic crisis of 1997 provided the opportunity for the United States through the 
IMF to ‘open up’ the Indonesian economy. This situation has aroused economic 
sentiment in Asia by accusing the United States backing of the IMF for interfering too 
much in internal affairs. Many foreign analysts argued that this was the end of Suharto 
‘empire’ and power. The Indonesian regime feared that international pressure could cause 
disintegration, especially when the UN firmly kept its resolution on East Timor’s self-
determination. Suharto’s successor, President Habibie, thus had no choice but to give the 
East Timor people a chance to decide their future.95  
Economically, the result of the East Timor referendum causes one to wonder 
given the amount of development assistance Indonesia provided East Timor. Before 
being incorporated into Indonesia, the East Timor economic outlook was more backward 
than when Indonesia gained independence in 1945. The infrastructure was virtually 
nonexistent. Before the 1999 referendum, the largest employer was the government. East 
Timor cannot boast of any natural resources, except coffee and a few agriculture 
products. An outlook of the East Timor economy can be seen in Table 4. 
D. THE DOMINO EFFECT OF THE EAST TIMOR CRISIS IN INDONESIA     
Before the East Timor referendum, the Government of Indonesia was deeply 
concerned about the ‘domino effect’ of East Timor’s separation. Although most 
Indonesians think an independent East Timor is not a big loss, it would have a great 
impact. They feel the East Timor vote for independence will encourage separatist 
movements in Indonesia and even other regions. Many scholars argue that the result of 
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 Before integration Since Integration 
Population 674.550 (1972 Census) 783.086 (1994 Census) 
GDP Per capita Less than US$ 40 US$ 398 (1996) 
Govt. 
Expenditure  
Unknown US$ 59.7 million (1996)  
School 2 Elementary, 2 Middle 
school 
1 High School 
30 Kindergartens,  
 684 Elementary, 109 Junior 
High Schools, 54 High Schools,  
4 Colleges 
Hospital  14 clinics  11 Hospitals, 332 village health 
centers 
Road 12.5 miles (paved) 1,022 miles (asphalted) 
 
Table 4. East Timor’s Infrastructure and Macroeconomic Outlook. 
Source: Asia Week96 
Independence for East Timor will spark a sentiment from other provinces and the 
neighboring countries. There is a concern that provinces such Aceh and Irian Jaya (west 
New Guinea) will capitalize on the precedent and attempt to follow suit. Internally after 
the East Timor referendum, local violence, for various reasons such as ethnic diversity, 
religious, insurgents backed by foreign aid, or even merely criminal, has broken out all 
over the archipelago not only in Aceh and Irian Jaya but also in Borneo, Moluccas, and 
some of the other islands, leaving hundreds dead, thousands fleeing, with the government 
at a loss, to be explained later in the next chapter. It also causes Indonesian neighbor’s to 
worry about ethnic conflict in their country, which has now happened in Malaysia, the 
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Philippines, Australia, and especially those who have minorities and refugees in their 
countries.97   
On the contrary, Donald Emmerson, a professor of political science and Southeast 
Asian studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has a different opinion about 
‘Balkanization’ in Indonesia. He argued that, “Indonesia is not Yugoslavia…and B.J. 
Habibie is not Slobodan Milosevic.” Emmerson sees several key differences between the 
two countries. Despite it diversity, Indonesia does not have a long history of ethnic hatred 
as seen in the Balkans. In short, he emphasizes not to underestimate the strength of 
Indonesian identity. As described in Chapter I, Emmerson also think that Indonesia’s 
national identity came from a common heritage and history.98  
Many scholars argue that troubles in Indonesian’s provinces are predictable 
reactions from the sudden lifting of a repressive regime. These are negative results of 
something that is, overall, a positive development: the democratization of Indonesia. 
Experts say that cases of pure ethnic hatred usually are associated with economic 
distinctions and the collapse of the economy.99   
1. Indonesia, the UN and the NGOs 
In many parts of Asia, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play 
important roles in raising the profile of the environment both among government elites 
and the general populace. They transmit information, educate, monitor the 
implementation of laws, and challenge official findings. In Asia, unlike in the United 
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States and Europe, the NGOs are less institutionalized. Some NGOs even are funded by 
the government to socialize government programs. The Indonesian Environment 
Ministry, for example, has called on NGOs to supplement its weak capacity and help 
mobilize public support for government programs.100 In short, there are a lot of things 
that cannot be done by the government, and only by the NGOs.  
Many scholars argue that an NGO’s actions are also a market and East Timor is 
one of their markets. One cannot hope to understand the NGOs’ reactions and policies 
without taking into account their business interests, their need to promote their image, 
their communication requirements, and the market shares that they have to win and 
maintain. The NGOs thus maintain their relationship with the public and the donors. 
Usually they cooperate with their technical expertise in the field with  journalists, and 
independent foundations. Sometimes, the overlap between the donors becomes 
problematic. Being the bearer of bad tidings always entails the risk of being identified 
with those bad things.101      
In the case of East Timor, the UN humanitarian agencies and the NGOs are 
working together to create a space within which the spirit of humanitarian action can be 
preserved. However, when individual relations between relief workers and the assisted 
populations are orchestrated by the authority of the UNTAET (the United Nations 
Transition Administration in East Timor), that humanitarian space disappears. It can be 
seen that, since the referendum, there is no particular interest from Indonesian NGOs to 
get involved in the East Timor transition because it is now becoming an international 
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commodity. As reported proudly by Hainsworth and McCloskey, the revelation of the 
truth about East Timor’s plight was an instance of media, voluntary agencies, and 
NGOs102 but, in fact, it becomes an expensive commodity for many publications from 
which the NGOs are paid. From the Indonesian standpoint, the good NGOs are those who 
are really independent as organizations that can correct and work together with the 
authority, or the UN agencies, to solve the problem, rather than to exploit it as a market 
commodity.             
2. Indonesia and the Human Rights Watchers        
On October 19, 1999, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly voted to 
accept the results of the August 30 referendum in which close to 80 percent of East 
Timor’s population had voted to separate from Indonesia. East Timor’s year of freedom 
from Indonesia was largely devoted to recovery and reconstruction from the post-
referendum violence between the pro-independence and the pro-integration groups that 
left the entire country in ruin. As they rebuilt, the East Timorese and UNTAET had to 
decide on how to handle the past abuses, how to prevent new ones, and how to build 
basic institutions to ensure the protection of human rights. Progress was slow, especially 
in facing the challenge from the Asian states for being to close to the Western world. The 
Asian concept of human rights had been proposed in the 1993 Vienna World Conference 
on Human Rights by several Asian governments, notably Singapore, China, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia, and set forth the so called “Asian concept of human rights,” in which 
Asians place greater value on the harmony of the community than individual freedoms. 
They argued that interpretation of international standards on human rights should be left 
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up to individual states to determine in accordance with their history, culture, political 
system, and level of economic development.103  
For Asian countries, the exercise of individual rights will emerge naturally from 
economic development. In addition, stability and order will be more highly valued than 
the protection of individual rights. The view of Indonesian officials echoes the Chinese 
position that most of the Asian countries also happen to be at the level of development 
which necessities the accordance of priority to the fulfillment of the most basic rights of 
peoples. Indonesians thus express this situation which was recognized by the East 
Timorese when abandoned by the Portuguese in 1975. How can one express one’s 
opinions if one is illiterate, how can one really enjoy the right to property if one lives well 
below the poverty line, and how can one join in labor associations if one is unemployed? 
However, the situation was changing along with the end of the Cold War. Fearing 
economic sanctions from the major countries, Indonesia is now forced to apply the idea 
of the ‘Western’ style of human rights, especially in the East Timor case. One sanction 
which has been dropped against Indonesia is the military embargo from the major 
countries and the second is the delay of the amount of dollars from the donor countries 
through the IMF. These two ‘Western’ style embargoes are really associated with the 
crisis in the region recently.104  
To conclude this chapter, the recent news shows that the Indonesian Human 
Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) has announced several names of those suspected 
in the involvement in post referendum East Timor, including some military officers, 
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former local government and leaders of militias. This will show to the international 
community the basic step that the new government of Indonesia is trying to take to 
accommodate the international demand on human rights abuses in East Timor. This also 
challenges the region regarding the concept of Asian human rights. Finally, to understand 
why the East Timor conflict differs from others, one should analyze and compare it with 
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So far, the debate has been mired in a dispute for over twenty-three years to 
define the complicated situation and a solution to the East Timor conflict. To understand 
how complex the situation is, one must learn from the background of the conflict. A 
historian identified 1975 as the plausible apex of Communism’s power in the modern 
world and he classified the Indonesia-East Timor dispute as an ideological conflict. This 
classification is very wrong, because Indonesia is a non-aligned state, which means the 
state was not committed to support only one block. There are several key differences 
between the Indonesia-East Timor dispute and conflicts elsewhere such as the conflicts in 
Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. It is also significant to understand that Indonesia is not, 
and has never been a communist state. Indonesia, while diverse, does not have a long 
history of ethnic conflicts among groups. The Indonesians were unified in their resistance 
and fought together to liberate their nation from Dutch imperialism. Thus, the ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda, Kosovo, and anywhere else can be considered incomparable with the 
East Timor case. The intent of this chapter is to analyze the different situation of the 
Indonesia-East Timor conflict with others. This chapter will start by the lessons learned 
from the East Timor case, for both Indonesia and the international community. It will 
then focus on the differences among conflict domestically and internationally. It will then 
close with an analysis of the current situation in order to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the events and players involved in building the future East Timor 
nation. 
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A. LESSONS FROM THE EAST TIMOR CRISIS    
The tiny island sharing a border with Indonesian West Timor as seen in Figure 2 
is now becoming a new sovereignty. The many remaining questions are not answered yet 
such as: does the referendum for East Timor solve the problem? For Indonesia, the 
autonomy or independence referendum set a potentially dangerous precedent for the 
future unity of the country. Indonesia is the forth-largest ‘archipelago’ nation on earth in 
population and it also is one of the most important economies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, its newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, faces some serious problems 
in the wake of the East Timor conflict. In the province of Aceh, a growing separatist 
movement is agitating for independence, and is demanding that a referendum be held on 
the issue. Even though Donald K. Emmerson has a different argument about 
disintegration in Indonesia, if Aceh’s people also vote to leave Indonesia, along with East 
Timor, it could trigger the disintegration of the nation. 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of East Timor after the 1999 Referendum. 
From Ref: [Virtual Information Center] 
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1. Implication for Indonesia     
Research has been done to fulfill the requirement of the unresolved problem, 
especially from the Indonesian perspective, by interviewing randomly, both directly or by 
using questionnaires, some Indonesian scholars, military generals, professors, members 
of parliament, members of NGOs and journalists who have expertise in the East Timor 
case. Most of them regret the loss of East Timor from Indonesia. They also said that 
unless the transitional president, Professor Habibie, gave the East Timorese an 
independence option, East Timor still would be one of Indonesia’s provinces right now, 
though eventually they encourage the people of Indonesia to respect the East Timorese 
decision by letting them go. When they come to the question of ‘what lesson can be 
learned from the East Timor case?’ almost all of them have the same thought by arguing 
that the East Timor conflict is a good case both for Indonesia, Portugal and the 
international community and should never happen again in the future. The following 
paragraphs will summarize their responses when asked about the East Timor case before 
and after the referendum in August 1999. 
As a member of the Indonesian parliament, Mangara Siahaan105 described how 
the process of ‘losing’ East Timor from Indonesia was brought up in every discussion in 
the parliament. He then explained that, in January 1999, the transitional president, 
Habibie, proposed asking the East Timorese whether they wished to remain with 
Indonesia, and if they wanted out, Habibie would advise the People’s Consultative 
Assembly to cancel its 1978 resolution and let them go. According to Siahaan, several 
                                                 
105 Mangara Siahaan, member of Indonesian House of Representative from the reformed Indonesian 
Democracy Party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri (the recent Vice-President), interviewed on April 16, 2001 
during his official visit to Washington D.C.  
 88 
meetings had been set up in the House of Representatives including hearing from the 
Indonesian negotiators to the peace talks between Indonesia and Portugal under UN 
auspices, among them Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Ambassador Lopez da 
Cruz, and East Timorese representatives, to understand what the latest situation in terms 
of diplomatic efforts. Though not yet decided, the ‘green light’ had been signaled by the 
UN and Portugal for Indonesia to enhance law and order in East Timor with some 
conditions: (1) Indonesia should secure East Timor’s political culture, (2) Indonesia 
should protect East Timorese religious practices, and (3) Indonesia should respect human 
rights in East Timor. In return, Indonesia guaranteed that the process of restoring order in 
East Timor would be completed within 5 to 10 years. However, “a wish is a wish,” 
President Habibie thought differently. He was very sure that the East Timorese would 
stay with Indonesia. Therefore, without any further discussion with the parliament nor 
with the Indonesian military (the TNI), Habibie decided to give East Timorese an 
independence option and forced the Indonesian Tripartite negotiators to sign the 5 May, 
1999 agreement that allowed East Timorese to decide their future on a referendum three 
months later.                   
Another contributor to the East Timor analysis is Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh,106 a 
constitutional law professor from the Gajah Mada University Indonesia. Unlike Mangara 
Siahaan, Fajrul Falaakh thought about East Timor from the point of view of law. “To 
build a new state, East Timorese should create their own law and order under the new 
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constitution, which is uneasy for them,” he explained. So far, Indonesia has done very 
little after the referendum regarding Indonesia itself and it is still facing its internal 
problems. However, Falaakh then added,  
the new government under President Abdurrahman Wahid should 
prioritize bilateral relationship with the new East Timor state by 
supporting East Timorese leaders to build their new country and to show 
the international community that Indonesians are not ‘barbarians,’ we 
know our responsibilities. 
This was described also by East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao during 
his visit to Jakarta on April 19, 2001. He said at the press conference that Indonesia is so 
important for the East Timorese, though Indonesia is always blamed by the East 
Timorese. He then closed the conference by saying, “We the people of East Timor will 
never be far away from Indonesia.”107  
From a political and military overview, several points have been contributed by 
Rosadi Brataadisuria, which focused on the lessons learned from the East Timor case. As 
a military career officer and retired with the rank of major general, Rosadi has seen many 
tours of duty in East Timor and he was an Army lieutenant colonel when he was 
dispatched for the first time to East Timor in 1976 as an intelligence analysis officer. 
“The Indonesian intervention in East Timor in the 1970s was purely a humanitarian 
intervention primarily, not a military intervention.” He truly explained when interviewed 
by phone. 
Indonesia sent unarmed volunteers to help East Timorese suffering from 
the on going civil war in 1975…but public opinion was biased by 
Australian media, saying that five Australian journalists were killed by 
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ABRI [Indonesian military forces]. In fact, they were armed and supported 
by the FRETILIN to push Indonesian volunteers out of East Timor. 
The following are his arguments about significant lessons learned for Indonesia from the 
East Timor case:          
• Without political support and the ability of inter-government diplomacy, 
military intervention is useless and it cannot stand alone because military, 
politics, and diplomacy support each other. Thus, East Timor was a good 
example to address this situation. 
• In terms of international relations, there is nothing such a as long lasting 
ally or ‘there is nothing for free.’ Indonesia was enjoying the support from 
its ‘Cold War’ Western allies when occupying East Timor. However, their 
support could be changed once they shift their interests.   
• The Indonesian government spent a lot to build up East Timor, but it was 
only physically, not mentally. No matter how many dollars Indonesia 
spent in East Timor, somehow even more than other provinces so far, if it 
was not what the East Timorese needed, that amount of dollars did not 
make any sense. 
• In terms of human rights, Indonesia should learn from the East Timor case 
in order to achieve peace and order internally, especially for the TNI 
(Indonesian military). Eventually, the global politics promoted by some 
major countries like the United States and its allies will hit the region 
including Indonesia. Democracy and human rights are their main concern, 
though Indonesia is a resource rich country, it should not ignore their 
concern. 
• There are many East Timorese who chose to stay with Indonesia. Some of 
them are now unhappy and became members of militia-armed wing 
because they were rejected by the East Timor’s transitional government. 
Therefore the UN, Indonesia, and East Timor should work together to 
achieve the reconciliation peacefully between parties who have fought for 
whatever reason, especially between the pro-independent and the pro-
integration groups.108         
Though there are still many lessons that can be learned from the the East Timor 
case, those descriptions above can be considered to represent all aspects of the Indonesian 
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failure in East Timor. Nevertheless, the broad response in Indonesia to the East Timor 
crisis was one of belligerent nationalism, of offence at having their state ‘insulted,’ of 
accusations of interference in domestic affairs and of ignoring the pride of the Indonesian 
people and not adequately appreciating their own long suffering, including struggling 
from colonialism in 1945-49 and dealing with dangerous communist and separatist 
movements. However, for many outsiders, and even many Indonesians, it was difficult to 
feel sympathy for these responses. Certainly, the TNI (Indonesian military) and its 
policies in East Timor did not represent the Indonesian people, but they did operate under 
the red and white flag. Therefore, when this flag was burned, especially in Australia, 
many Indonesians were deeply upset. This could raise nationalism among Indonesians.    
2. East Timor: The Post Referendum 
The tragic events in East Timor since the territory’s vote on self determination on 
August 30, 1999 have raised a number of critical questions about the process agreed to by 
Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations on May 5, 1999. Some issues include the role 
and function of the UN, the behavior of the Indonesian military and political institutions 
and the processes of development. Thus, this section will try to examine what would be 
good for the East Timorese to build their nation.   
As reported recently by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor [UNTAET], the people of the ‘non-self government’ of East Timor are now 
exercising substantial governmental powers through the all-Timorese National Council, 
the East Timorese-majority cabinet and the all-Timorese Judiciary. On 19 October 2000, 
Jose Ramos Horta was sworn in as a cabinet member for foreign affairs. The East 
Timorese now hold five of the nine cabinet portfolios, with the other four being internal 
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administration, infrastructure, economic affairs and social affairs. At the first session, the 
National Council elected Xanana Gusmao, president of the National Council of Timorse 
Resistance (CNRT), as a speaker and he was also convinced to be the candidate for 
president of the new state. On December 12, 2000, he outlined East Timor’s political 
agenda. It was expected that the Constituent Assembly would become the first legislature 
of the independent state. However, on March 28, 2001, Gusmao withdrew from the 
National Council that is preparing the groundwork for August’s election. He said that 
internal bickering was standing in the way of the move to independence. Thus “East 
Timor independence will take time,” said Gusmao during his visit to Jakarta.109  
Economically, the lack of natural resources is one of the major problems faced by 
the East Timorese leaders. The East Timor economy mainly depends on donor countries 
and economic development in the region. There are criticisms that aid money, promised 
from the developed world for reconstruction, is slow in materializing, whereas, in effect, 
nothing less than a new ‘Marshall Plan’110 is needed if the territory was to be in a 
position to redress the legacy of the Indonesian occupation. Cooperation with Indonesia, 
therefore, remains significant to avoid economic shock in East Timor.     
For the East Timorese, the struggle for independence from Indonesia has not yet 
ended. This was also stressed by the East Timorese leader Gusmao that independence of 
East Timor should be followed by other phases. The eradication of illiteracy and the 
construction of a prosperous society with a modern and self-sufficient economy will then 
be the other main goals. Furthermore, the objective of the struggle for independence is to 
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build the state of Timor Lorosae, the East Timorse name for their new state, that fights 
for peace, democracy, and prosperity for all, regardless of political or religious 
conviction, race, color or social and cultural origin. Should the East Timorese fail to do 
this, East Timor will be increasingly backward.111  
3. The UN and Wahid’s Government  
In September 1999, a United Nations peacekeeping mission (INTERFET, 
International Force in East Timor) was dispatched to East Timor under the leadership and 
command of Australia to protect the Timorese from pro-integration militias seeking to 
gain control. The militias had been attacking refugee camps and running propaganda 
campaigns to prevent pro-independence Timorese from remaining in East Timor. The 
Australians who led INTERFET mission remained until February 2000, when the United 
Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMET) replaced INTERFET, a force organized by the 
UN but still led by the Australians to maintain peace and assist with East Timor’s 
transition to independence.112   
On October 25, 1999, the UN Security Council had, actually, approved UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)’s mandate in Resolution 1272 of 
1999. UNTAET planned to replace all pre-existing authorities in the territory. 
Nevertheless, by the time UNTAET began to deploy in November 1999, there were 
conditions for success that are rarely available to peace missions since the belligerent 
power had completely withdrawn. Though UNTAET had failed to anticipate and prevent 
after ballot chaos, the local population openly welcomed the UN. 
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From the UN point of view, Resolution 1272 of 1999 became the instrument for 
bestowing sovereignty over East Timor to the UN, but the problem was rooted in the 
circumstances of the UNTAET’s inception. On October 19, 1999, CNRT leader Gusmao 
forwarded the UN proposals for a transitional administration, outlining a Timorese role in 
the form of a Transitional Council. In retrospect, Gusmao’s model for Timorese 
involvement was relatively modest, but the UN ignored it altogether. Therefore, Gusmao 
and the CNRT publicly expressed their frustration with the lack of communication from 
the UNTAET. This was somehow the reason why Gusmao resigned from the National 
Council and this also showed the authoritarian attitude of the UNTAET.113    
As witnessed in December 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid proposed 
transforming Indonesia into a group of federated states where a collection of relatively 
autonomous states would be organized around a central government in Jakarta. However, 
it was opposed by the party that has the largest presence in the legislature (the vice 
president’s party) and the TNI. In the mind of “Gusdur” (Wahid’s nickname), it would be 
unfair not to let Aceh have a referendum also. Wahid’s comment shocked people by 
seeming to endorse the domino theory. However, Wahid soon explained that in the 
referendum he envisioned, the Aceh people would be allowed to decide only whether to 
apply Islamic laws inside their province, not whether to withdraw from the republic. 
Although the Wahid administration has allowed East Timor independence, there 
are still a number of anti-independence militia seeking to reoccupy East Timor that 
according to the UNTAET were supported by the TNI. The Commander of TNI General 
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Wiranto publicly denied it by saying that they [militias] used TNI’s uniform because 
some of them were ex-East Timorese TNI and they were beyond the TNI’s control. 
However, the September 6, 2000 murder of three UN aid workers in Indonesian West 
Timor, in which one of them was an American, forced the United States to consider 
possible economic sanctions against Indonesia if they fail to disarm and control the 
militia in East Timor and guarantee the safe return of all East Timor refugees back to East 
Timor. Shortly after the murders, Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Indonesia 
and issued the warning of possible economic sanctions if Indonesia did not gain control 
of the militia causing the violence in Timor. President Wahid was in UN headquarters 
when the murders happened. He took immediate action by ordering the head of the 
Indonesian civil police to arrest all militia leaders.   
It is also significant to know that, until now, the UN mission in East Timor has 
been there for almost three years. So far, little has been done in East Timor. As reported 
currently, among the East Timorese, there has been frustration over the failure of the 
UNTAET to involve more local people in drawing up a comprehensive blueprint of what 
they want their new nation to be. The UN mandate to the UNTAET is to hand over 
security responsibility to the new East Timor defense force as soon as they are ready. 
However, the withdrawal of UN troops removes the buffer between the long time 
enemies, the pro-integration and the pro-independence, likely leading to a renewal of 
fighting and a cross border war. Thus, there is a tendency that the UN still needs to stay 
longer to accomplish it mission.  
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B. THE SECESSIONIST THREAT: ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND MOLUCCAS 
Among the problems facing the post-Suharto transition to democracy is the 
heightened expression of discontent in some of its regions including Aceh, the Moluccas 
and the western half of the island of New Guinea, called Irian Jaya by the Indonesians, 
especially after East Timor’s ballot in 1999. Responses expected or required from Jakarta 
to this state of affairs range from proposals for significant regional autonomy to secession 
or independence. Parallels are frequently drawn between the situation in Irian Jaya, or 
West New Guinea and East Timor. The following paragraphs thus will show the different 
conflict between one and another. 
1. Aceh  
Aceh, located on the northern tip of Sumatra, is considered one of Indonesia’s 
most ‘troubled areas’ along with Irian Jaya. Unlike East Timor, Aceh was one of the 
earliest supporters of the Republic of Indonesia. Nevertheless, because of political 
mishandling by Jakarta, the province soon turned against the central government. Trouble 
began when the central government incorporated Aceh into the province of North 
Sumatra, reducing its status from a province to regency (bigger than district) in early 
1953. The trouble lasted until 1959 when the central government promised to give the 
province a special status with autonomy in religious and customary laws. 
Recently, separatists who sought to establish an independent Islam state, which 
violated the 1945 Constitution, in the Special Region of Aceh, continued unrest in 
portions of the region. Many Acehnese perceived themselves as disadvantaged in Aceh’s 
major industrial development projects because income flowed out of the region to the 
center, and outsiders were perceived as receiving better employment opportunities and 
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the economic benefits of industrialization than the Acehnese residents. The Separatists, 
which called themselves the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), were 
supported by some of the countries where their leaders now live114  
2. Irian Jaya (the West New Guinea)            
The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, and the events that followed it, 
acted as a catalyst to opponents of Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya, which resulted in an 
upsurge in incidents between locals and outsiders. Jakarta felt that, without foreign aid, 
locals would not react so aggressively. President Habibie responded with a willingness to 
apologize for human rights violations but did little in practice and the incidents 
continued. Following the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President in October 1999, 
some concessions to political expression were made, from a change to the territory’s 
name to West Papua followed by giving permission to hold a Papuan Congress to discuss 
the future of the territory. This, at best, greatly embarrassed President Wahid and 
Indonesia, and at worst, could trigger a cycle not dissimilar to the one that unfolded in 
East Timor. This was also for the first time since 1963 that Indonesia has not 
countenanced any suggestion of discussion about the status of Irian Jaya other than as a 
part of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Some scholars argued that the Irian Jaya case is just the same illustration with 
East Timor. In fact the two territories are very different: Indonesia has a claim in its law 
to Irian Jaya that it did not have with East Timor: Irian Jaya was fully recognized as part 
of the Republic of Indonesia and it is part of Dutch territory, while East Timor was not. 
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Therefore, there is no question that Indonesia would approve the independence for Irian 
Jaya.115 
3. The Moluccas  
During the first year of the new government under President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, they were still coming to terms with the loss of the province of East Timor and 
serious separatist violence in Aceh and elsewhere. It was also shocked by the worsening 
violence in Maluku, Indonesia’s name for the Moluccas, and so far, it has offered no 
solution. 
There still remains the unanswered question of why religious tensions occurred in 
the Moluccas since for generations the communities had lived side by side. Christians and 
Muslims lived harmoniously in adjoining villages. Christians would help build a 
community mosque; Muslims would help build a church. Unlike in East Timor, some 
analysts believe that growing tensions between Christians and Muslims erupted into 
violence after the Ambonese Christians, the native Moluccas, called on the Republic of 
the South Moluccas or RMS supporters in the Netherlands to help them stop a decline in 
their community’s influence. Christians have seen Muslim settlers take an increasing 
number of positions of influence as well as greater control of the region’s business 
activity.116      
Having been traumatized by the Aceh and East Timor cases, the Indonesian 
military and police did little to restore law and order in Moluccas. They were afraid of the 
human rights abuses that happened in Aceh and East Timor. Under the new regulation, it 
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seems that the military is powerless and they cannot do anything unless the state declares 
a state of emergency. Therefore, the situation in Moluccas was much better after the 
government of Moluccas declared the territory in a state of emergency and asked 
President Wahid to deploy battalions of TNI from other islands to Moluccas.   
Though it is not the main concern, Indonesia’s ethnic diversity also begins to 
spark problems such as what happened recently in the Kalimantan (or Borneo) island 
between the Dayak and Maduranese. The fundamental problem was almost the same with 
conflict elsewhere in the archipelago, mostly between locals and outsiders. This was the 
basic difference with the East Timor case. The tension arose usually because the outsiders 
sought to exploit the local’s natural resources or businesses, with some analysts saying, 
“It’s all about money.” These situations will still continue until Indonesia’s economic 
recovery is completely achieved.   
C. LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: RWANDA AND 
KOSOVO 
This title is somehow a lesson not only for Indonesia, but also for the international 
community in the ‘remaking of world order,’117 regardless of their interests. The current 
situation in East Timor, where militias are killing independence supporters, requires 
urgent reconciliation supported by the international community, and especially the 
neighboring countries. In the Rwanda case in 1994, unfortunately, the almost complete 
lack of response by the world’s major powers and the United Nations only serves to re-
emphasize that the international community still appears to lack the political will to stop 
such atrocities. In the case of Kosovo, human rights advocates are nonetheless justified in 
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arguing that the international community must not stand idly by when people are being 
slaughtered wholesale. However, doing something does not mean inflaming the situation 
further. NATO bombings was an example that it could not stop the conflict. In fact, it 
escalated the violence in Kosovo. 
In comparing East Timor with other conflicts, the reason for the disputes, and not 
just comparing the casualties, should be understood completely. As reported by 
Chomsky, though there is no one official reason, it can be seen that in the case of 
Kosovo, Serbia possessed a strong military. The Indonesian army, unlike Serbia, is 
heavily dependent on the United States, as was revealed in mid-September 1999, when 
Clinton finally gave the signal to desist. Russia strongly opposed the NATO bombing, 
but that did not deter the United States and its allies.118  
Another incomparable situation is clearly shown in 1999. In Kosovo, there was a 
desperate need for tribunal indictment. Furthermore, proving the scale of the crimes is 
also important to NATO politically, to show why 78 days of air strikes against Serbian 
forces and infrastructure were necessary, by the intriguing logic, conventional in Western 
doctrine, that Serbian crimes provide retrospective justification for the NATO bombing 
of which there were any anticipated consequences. While in East Timor, the TNI or the 
Indonesian military was armed, trained, funded, and supported by the United States and 
its allies from the beginning of the occupation until the referendum. Therefore, should 
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Indonesian military personnel be indicted for crimes that could rebound to the United 
States and allies?119    
In Rwanda, the situation is slightly different. The Rwanda case dealt with the 
slow response from the international community, and the UN in particular. When the 
ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi took place, a UN peacekeeping force, 
UNAMIR, was present in the capital, Kigali. The UN Security Council decided to reduce 
the number of peacekeeping forces instead of approving the UNAMIR commander 
request for more UN troops. Eventually, however, the Security Council approved French 
intervention after the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was on the verge of 
defeating the genocidal regime, too late though to save more than a handful of lives. 
While in East Timor, the UN forces never entered East Timor without permission from 
Jakarta. Unless Washington reacted quickly, the TNI would proceed to control East 
Timor. It was not until September 9, 1999 that Washington suspended the Pentagon’s 
formal military ties with the TNI. Almost instantly, Jakarta announced that it would allow 
a peacekeeping force. It is clearly understood that the United States has long had 
tremendous influence in Indonesia.        
D. THE FUTURE PROBLEMS: REFUGEE AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION 
MOVEMENT     
After the referendum, the problems did not just disappear. The murder of the UN 
aid workers in September 2000 sparked an international outcry and resulted in the hurried 
exodus of around 400 foreign aid personnel who were working with about 130,000 East 
Timorese refugees remaining in Indonesian West Timor. According to Western 
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journalists reports, the militia have gained control of the refugee camps and intimidated 
East Timorese waiting to return home. However, Jakarta has also claimed to have 
progressed in investigating the human rights abuses and atrocities committed in East 
Timor including arresting leaders of the militia.                
1. Refugee Problem 
The Wahid administration, in both Jakarta and West Timor, wants the refugees to 
return, as does the East Timorese leadership. According to the UN report, more than 
150,000 refugees have returned, although an estimated 100,000 were still in West Timor. 
However, the withdrawal of all United Nations workers from West Timor, following the 
September 6 killing of three staff members of the UNHCR, has affected a key area of 
concern, especially for Indonesia. The postponement of a fourth round of bilateral talks 
scheduled for early September left several issue unresolved, including the restoration of 
public records, archive and cultural artifacts; the term under which East Timorese 
students will be able to continue their studies at Indonesian institutions, and the 
arrangement for free and unhindered movement of people and goods between the enclave 
of Oecussi and the rest of East Timor.120 (See Figure 2)    
The UN also reported that refugees faced intimidation from the pro-integration 
militias who had been living in the refugee camps since the referendum. This includes a 
mass misinformation campaign that has saturated the refugees. East Timor’s lack of a 
functioning judicial system as well as economic disincentives presents additional 
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obstacles. Counter to international norms of civilian refugee camps, camps in West Timor 
are highly militarized, especially since the exodus of the UNHCR workers.  
2. Militia Problem 
There are explanations for the TNI (Indonesian military) support of the militias, 
though the factual data are unclear. (1) The TNI is very bitter about East Timor’s 
independence, which is the first real loss the TNI has ever suffered. Soldiers came to East 
Timor to be trained and for career advancement. Consequently, the TNI feels close 
emotional attachment to East Timor that it is not ready to relinquish. (2) Militia leaders 
are, in effect, blackmailing the TNI in order to continue receiving monetary and military 
support. The militia leaders know a great deal about the TNI chain of command 
responsible for the post ballot destruction of East Timor, and may threaten to reveal the 
truth about what happened in East Timor if the TNI does not maintain its support, and  
(3) the militia will always use refugees in order to fight against the pro-independence 
groups. To know more about the militia, the following are the players and their interests 
considered for future resistance for an independent East Timor if they are not recalled to 
join the reconciliation. Also see Figure 3. Thus, the major pro-integration militia consists 
of:   
• Forum for Unity, Democracy, and Justice (FPDK)  Led by 
Domingos Soares. Merged with other groups on June 23, 1999 to form the 
United Front for Autonomy (UNIF) 
• Front of the People of East Timor (BRTT)  Chaired by Basilio 
Araujo Francisco Xavier Lopez da Cruz. Also merged to form the UFA. 
Reportedly has army support and is active in pro-integration propaganda 
campaigns. 
• Halilintar (“lightning”)  Militia located in the Bobonaro region and led 
by Joao Tavares, a major landlord in the area. It was the third element to 
merge into the UFA. Estimated strength of 800. 
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• Aitarak  Located in Dili, led by Eurico Guterres. Have been reportedly 
seen being trained by TNI. Estimated strength of 5000. Heavily armed 
with AK-47s. 
• BMP (Besi Merah Putih “the Red and White Iron”)  The name is a 
reference to the Indonesian flag. Located in Liquica, with an estimated 
strength of 2000. 
• United Front for Autonomy (UNIF)  The pro-autonomy political 
coalition formed June 23, 1999 to campaign in the August referendum. 




Figure 3. Map of Pro- Integration Militia Threat in East Timor, 1999. 
From Ref: [Virtual Information Center] 
 
As a conclusion, the overall political situation within East Timor as well as the 
regional context, including relations with its neighbors; the need for the accelerated 
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return of the refugees and care in both West and East Timor are the main problems for 
the future East Timor. These are good lessons for all interested parties: Indonesia, East 
Timor, the UN, the region and the major powers. The only key country important enough 
to encourage the East Timorese to build their new nation is Indonesia, because of East 
Timor’s 23 years occupation by Indonesia. Since Indonesia is also a key player in the 
ASEAN, it might be significant for East Timor to find the ASEAN as its course of action, 
especially in terms of economics prosperity. Therefore, the following chapter will deal 
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For almost 23 years, East Timor was occupied and mishandled by Indonesia on 
orders of President Suharto. In 1999, a referendum was held in which the East Timorese 
voted overwhelmingly for independence. East Timor is now under a United Nations 
transition administration (UNTAET). In keeping with its longstanding policy of non-
interference, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members never 
commented on the accusations of human rights issues in East Timor. Nevertheless, the 
other ASEAN members, at least, did not have a conflict with the East Timorese. If today 
East Timor has the best relationship possible with Washington, Canberra, and London, 
which had in the past sold weapons to the Suharto regime, what are the potential 
problems in the future East Timor might have in its relations with ASEAN. This chapter 
will try to analyze the response of ASEAN after the East Timor referendum by focusing 
on the background of ASEAN, its challenges after the Cold War, and East Timor’s 
prospective alliances with the ASEAN. 
A. ASEAN’S ROLE IN THE COLD WAR    
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN’s aim was originally to reduce external 
tensions between Southeast Asia’s non-communist states, with the intention of freeing 
their weak post-colonial governments to tackle internal communist challenges, and to 
address development priorities. The most serious tension was the undeclared war the 
konfrontasi or Confrontation waged by President Sukarno’s Indonesia against the new 
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Federation of Malaysia from 1963 to 1966. It was pursued largely for domestic political 
reasons, and ended with General Suharto ousting Sukarno. 
During the Cold War period, ASEAN played a confidence-building role, opening 
new channels of communication between countries whose relations had been marked by 
‘mutual ignorance, isolation, and conflict.’ ASEAN’s substantive claim was to have 
provided an incentive for Southeast Asia’s non-communist states to manage their 
differences without resorting to armed conflict. However, ASEAN’s founder did not 
create the association as a mechanism for resolving disputes between countries. To 
accommodate the disputes, therefore, ASEAN formed the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) in 1976,122 a high council for formal dispute-resolution. This has 
never been functional because of the ‘non-interference principle’ of the ASEAN 
members. This principle thus became a guiding core of belief of ASEAN for three 
reasons: 
• Its member feared external support for their domestic communist 
insurgencies  
• ASEAN’s ethnic, religious, political, and economic diversity risked 
irreconcilable differences between its members unless these aspects of 
national life were excluded from discussion, and 
• The association’s governments were unwilling to cede their new-founded 
sovereignty and to comment on each other’s internal affairs. 
To preserve the sovereignty of its members, ASEAN’s decision-making was 
based on consultation and consensus. Issues that could not be resolved in this way were 
set aside. However, not all of these issues were resolved completely by ASEAN ‘s 
leaders. The East Timor case thus became a dilemma for ASEAN leaders since Jakarta 
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never spoke out about its ‘internal’ problem. As described in Chapter III, because of the 
obsession with the non-interference principle, the leaders of ASEAN had uttered virtually 
no protest and instead had completely turned their back on East Timor and its people. The 
simple reason appears to be that they had not wanted to embarrass Indonesia. Such a 
move might jeopardize their highly-priced “ASEAN solidarity.”      
B. ASEAN’S POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL ORDER 
The fall of the Soviet Union presented ASEAN with challenges, as well as 
opportunities. The Association emerged from the Cold War as Southeast Asia’s pre-
eminent institution, in a position to contemplate enlargement on its own terms. It could 
boast over two decades of peace among its members, accompanied by increasingly strong 
economic performance. The overall security environment had dramatically improved 
with the disappearance of Sino-Soviet rivalry.        
1. Remaking the Regional Security Community   
According to Acharya, constructing security communities involves developing 
shared understandings about peaceful conduct, whereby interests previously pursued 
through war are instead pursued through peaceful means. In the case of ASEAN, many 
analysts argue that ASEAN’s record could be criticized for never invoking its formal 
dispute-settlement mechanism that the ‘High Council’ provided under the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC). However, an adequate evaluation of ASEAN’s role in 
dispute settlement must look at its norms and processes of interaction, which are less 
tangible but may have a more significant impact in keeping intra-mural peace. The 
ASEAN leaders thus define the process of interaction by expressing the ‘ASEAN Way.’ 
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This is also viewed as a continuing process of identity building, which relies upon 
conventional ‘modern’ principles of interstate relations as well as traditional and culture-
specific modes of socialization and decision making prevalent in the region.123 
For its identity, ASEAN’s decision makers are likely to prefer to use the 
‘collective identity’ rather than a single identity. There can be several indicators of 
collective identity: 
• A commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to place an expanding 
number of issues on the multilateral agenda, which have been previously 
tackled through unilateral and bilateral channels. 
• The development of security and cooperation, including collective 
defense, collaboration against internal threats, collective security, and 
cooperative security measures. 
• Identity formation can be sensed from the boundaries and membership 
criteria of the group124  
For ASEAN, the definition of what constitutes a region and commonly held 
notions (insiders and outsiders) are important. In addition, ASEAN’s definition about a 
security community is always related to its norms and process of socialization. The role 
of norms is investigated with respect to their regulatory as well as effects, though in some 
cases ASEAN is facing a dilemma about the emergence of its security community such as 
militias or international terrorism. To understand how ASEAN forms its security 
communities, Figure 4 will show the interplay between norms and socialization in the 
making of ASEAN’s security communities. 
                                                 
123 Ibid, pp. 21-28. 










Figure 4. Norms, Socialization and Security Communities. 
From Ref: [Amitav Acharya, Constructing A Security Communities in SE Asia, p. 29] 
The figure above explains that the central focus is on the role of norms, both 
legal-rational [Non-interference and non-use of force], and the socio-cultural 
[consultations and consensus], could play in the socialization process which may be 
redefined by the interests and identities of the ASEAN members.   
2. ASEAN’s Management of Conflict 
The debate over non-interference has revealed how far the expectations of 
ASEAN have changed since 1967. At its formation, the Association’s purpose was 
exclusively political and security related. All of its cooperation was a means to these 
political security ends. After thirty years, ASEAN has embarked on a process of 
economic integration, which was expected to produce economic outcomes. ASEAN has 
become the world’s most institutionalized regional association apart from the EU, 
cooperating in every public policy and requiring a massive investment of national 
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resources by its membership. However, it has not always evolved smoothly. Tensions 
arose among internal members, which in fact, became a dilemma for its non-interference 
principle. The Indonesia-East Timor dispute might be the most crucial problem in the last 
two decades. In terms of conflict management, therefore, ASEAN tends to use its own 
way (or ASEAN way) such as the avoidance of legal and formal procedures, and written 
treaties. 
a. The Avoidance of Legal and Formal Procedures    
This part of the “ASEAN Way” could be seen when Singapore and 
Malaysia decided to refer their dispute over Pedra Branca to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in September 1994. This initiative was followed by Malaysia and Indonesia 
in early 1997 in the dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. It was significant 
because Jakarta had proposed to exhaust all diplomatic options before resorting to it. All 
disputes in Southeast Asia are detailed in Table 5. Should the dispute be subject to any 
form of third-party mediation, then the mediator should be one of the members of 
ASEAN. Despite being an  avoidance of formal mechanisms, it is consistent with the 
ASEAN members’ commitment to the norm on the peaceful settlement of disputes and a 
detraction from its norm in seeking regional solutions to regional problems. 
b. ASEAN’s Treaties     
The Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, known as 
ZOPFAN, becomes the second most important treaty after the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC). Under these treaties, disputes regarding its interpretation are to be 
settled by peaceful means, including negotiations, mediations, enquiries, and 
conciliations. If no settlement can be reached within one month, then the dispute may be 
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referred to the ICJ. Though the legal mechanisms are provided, ASEAN officials have 
emphasized the importance of political dialogue to manage their disputes. Legal 
procedures are to be used only as the last course of action.125 
 
Areas Claimers 
The northern Andaman Sea Burma and India 
The eastern Gulf of Thailand Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia 
The southwestern Gulf of Thailand  Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
An area north, west, and east of 
Natuna Islands 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia,  
And China 
Off-shore Brunei Brunei, Malaysia, possibly China,  
Possibly Vietnam  
The Gulf of Tonkin  China and Vietnam 
The Spratly Islands Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the  
Philippines, China, and Taiwan 
The Sipadan and Ligitan Islands Indonesia and Malaysia * 
The Arafura Sea Indonesia (now East Timor) and  
Australia * 
 
Table 5. Disputed Maritime Areas in SE Asia. 
After Ref: [Tien and Cheng, The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific, p263] 
(*) Refers to ICJ 
 
3. Enlarging ASEAN: Lessons Learned from Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Admission of Myanmar 
In 1992, the ASEAN leaders announced that the Association would seek a close 
relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the Indo-Chinese countries, 
following the settlement of Cambodia. ASEAN also emphasized that the Treaty of Amity 
                                                 
125 Ibid, pp. 128-133. 
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and Cooperation (TAC) was open for signature by all Southeast Asian states. In this year 
also Vietnam and Laos signed the treaty, and attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as 
observers. With its enlargement, ASEAN promised to extend to the whole of Southeast 
Asia the peaceful and prosperous culture of cooperation established by ASEAN’s original 
members. By joining ASEAN, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia committed 
themselves to preventing disputes from arising with their neighbors, and renounced the 
threat or use of force to resolve disagreements. 
a. Vietnam: A Historic Act of Reconciliation 
The end of the Cold War and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia 
redefined relations between ASEAN and Vietnam. As assessed by many analysts, 
Vietnam’s admission into ASEAN in 1995 has been described as ‘a historic act of 
reconciliation.’ It could help to restore the Indochina divide by opening channels of 
communication and providing incentives to manage and resolve disputes. Hanoi argues 
that ASEAN membership has provided a good gesture toward the long-standing 
differences such as disputes over sea boundaries. In addition, Under the Paris Peace 
Accords, Thailand and Vietnam, together with the other parties, committed themselves 
not to interfere in Cambodia’s internal affairs. This was also bound by the principle of 
ASEAN’s non-interference principle. 
In terms of economic development, the government of Vietnam has 
participated heavily in attending ASEAN meetings, including hosting ASEAN’s sixth 
summit meeting in December 1998. Other members regard Hanoi’s efforts to adapt to 
ASEAN’s informal and consensus-based style as remarkable, given the country’s 
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communist system and recent isolation. For these reasons, there has been no doubt about 
ASEAN’s role in facilitating Vietnam’s entry into global affairs.126  
b. Myanmar: Breaking Chinese Encirclement  
For the ASEAN’s original members, Myanmar’s membership was 
intended to limit China’s strategic influence in Southeast Asia. The Association cannot, 
however, compete with China in providing military assistance. In addition, economic 
adversity has made Myanmar more difficult for the ASEAN to offer Myanmar trade and 
investment benefits, especially after the 1997 Asian economic crisis. It was hoped, 
therefore, that participating in ASEAN would ease Myanmar away from its isolationist 
mindset and could encourage greater openness in its society. 
In terms of regionalism, Yangon does not seem prepared to follow 
ASEAN’s rule. The regime has failed to offer sustained political concessions in response 
to the ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement.’ In the political arena, almost all ASEAN 
leaders have advised and encouraged the regime to open dialogue with the pro-
democracy opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Since the approaches of individual 
ASEAN’s government differ, therefore, there is an agreement that constructive 
engagement must be bilateral approaches, and that it would be private and a high level 
relationship. This can be another ‘informal and flexible’ way of how the Association 
handles the tension.127           
                                                 
126 Tien and Cheng, The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific, pp. 122-124. 
127 Acharya, Constructing A Security Community in SE Asia, pp. 108-115. 
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c. Cambodia: The ASEAN’s Dilemma of Non-Use of Force 
Cambodia became ASEAN’s tenth member on April 30, 1999, almost two 
years after its intended admission date. Under ASEAN’s non-interference non-use of 
force principles, ASEAN’s leaders had to postpone Cambodia’s admission because of 
Hun Sen’s 1997 coup. ASEAN was compelled to outline the political conditions under 
which the country would be admitted. At the urging of the international community, the 
Association unwillingly mediated between the Cambodian parties through a troika of 
ASEAN’s original members, namely Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sensing 
the Association’s vulnerability, the Cambodian leadership explicitly rejected the ASEAN 
troika and accused the Association of violating its own central principle. ASEAN’s troika 
thus almost made no progress unless Japan intervened. As Cambodia’s major aid donor, 
Japan proposed the UN create a UN-coordinated Joint International Observer Group 
(JIOG), as did the ASEAN. This intervention was to set the cease-fire agreement, the 
return of political exiles, severing links between ousted royalist and the illegal Khmer 
Rouge, and free and fair elections, which was finally accepted by Hun Sen.128 
As a conclusion of all of the above lessons learned, the experiences of ASEAN 
since its establishment 33 years ago could only survive if it follows its norms firmly, 
among which are non-interference, non-use of force, regional autonomy, the avoidance of 
collective defense, and the practice of the ‘ASEAN way’ were the most salient. Among 
its survival, there were successes and challenges. ASEAN’s leaders consider that the 
recent formation of the ASEAN-10, is the most successful effort that has never happened 
before. However, along the success strategy, there must be challenges ahead. The case of 
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East Timor, for example, will then be the next challenge for ASEAN. Should it become 
ASEAN-11? The next section will thus analyze all approaches and possibilities.  
C. REBUILDING EAST TIMOR AND THE FUTURE ASEAN OUTLOOK  
As described in Chapter II, obsessed with the principle not to interfere in internal 
problems, the ASEAN members did nothing as East Timor went up in flames after voting 
overwhelmingly for independence in September 1999. It was witnessed when Indonesia 
asked the United Nations to help restore order in what has been its province for 23 years 
The ASEAN-10 responded only tardily to a request for troops. While ASEAN was 
already reeling from the regional economic crisis, which weakened Southeast Asia of its 
economic dynamism and left members divided. The recent enlargement, with the addition 
of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, also has weakened ASEAN’s cohesion and 
undermined its ability to operate in the international arena. If ASEAN was turning its 
back on East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, it now has a good chance to 
recover its reputation by contributing significantly and collaborating with the East 
Timor’s transition authority (the UN) to rebuild East Timor. 
1. East Timor Challenges ASEAN’s Principles   
In the Western view, Indonesia’s troubles in East Timor are shaping up as a ‘big 
test’ for ASEAN, which include some of Indonesia’s closest allies. As described earlier, 
the ASEAN-10 has a strict policy of non-interference its political affairs unless any 
members ask for help. However, ASEAN also advocates an Asian solution to regional 
security crises, and it now faces an unprecedented challenge to the principle of 
Indonesia’s action in East Timor. In addition, ASEAN countries’ slow reaction to the 
                                                 
128 Ibid, pp. 115-120. 
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East Timor crisis has exposed the group’s weakness at crisis management. ASEAN was 
created 33 years ago to foster economic and political solidarity among Southeast Asian 
states in the midst of fears that communism posed a threat to the region. Neither ASEAN 
as a group nor any of its members has ever taken a direct military role in a serious 
security crisis involving another member country. 
ASEAN dilemma of not interfering in internal problems had actually been seen 
since Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor in 1975, when its member agreed that East 
Timor was Indonesia ‘s internal problem. This situation continued until another event 
forced ASEAN leaders to vote at UN Headquarters in October 1999 when the western 
countries in the UN’s Geneva-based Human Rights Commission voted for an 
investigation of East Timor. Nevertheless, ASEAN’s countries on the commission either 
opposed or abstained, including Japan and Korea. 
In terms of sending a peacekeeping force, ASEAN actually has experience in the 
Cambodia conflict, where members of ASEAN sent a small contingent of military or 
police to protect a UN-sponsored national election in 1993. At that time, Cambodia was 
not an ASEAN member and the election was generally peaceful and orderly. Unlike in 
Cambodia, the East Timor crisis was different because ASEAN’s biggest member was at 
the heart of the problem. ASEAN leaders, reluctant to embarrass Indonesia, were largely 
passive as the likelihood of the tension between East Timor’s the pro-integration and pro-
independence grew after the September referendum. The ASEAN leaders only began to 
seriously discuss participation in a peacekeeping effort after President Habibie officially 
asked other ASEAN countries to participate in the force to balance the role of Australian 
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troops. Many Indonesians and their fellow Asians were very offended by Australia 
leading the UN forces in East Timor.129  
2. East Timorese View in Entering the ‘ASEAN Way’       
Indonesia’s decision to allow East Timor to determine its status by popular 
consultation may ultimately lead to the formation of a new independent nation in 
Southeast Asia. If East Timor does become independent, it may be a candidate for 
ASEAN membership. The East Timor leadership, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos 
Horta, have stated that the territory should join the Association, as well as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum together with the other 16-members. ASEAN leaders believe that, if the 
territory chooses independence, Indonesia should promote its membership in order to 
ease its absorption into the region. The problem is: can East Timor follow the ASEAN’s 
principle or the so-called the ‘ASEAN way?’, which was already explained earlier. 
For ASEAN-10, learning from the ASEAN enlargement, East Timor admission 
could be very helpful either for East Timorese or ASEAN itself. However, enlargement 
would also be costly. Although ASEAN prided itself on its ‘unity in diversity,’ 
enlargement substantially increased its political and economic variety, and the diversity 
of strategic views among its members. The Association’s political spectrum broadened 
with the inclusion of the communist governments of Vietnam and Laos, and of 
Myanmar’s authoritarian military regime, just as liberal democracy was becoming more 
entrenched in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Therefore, a good benefit for a 
                                                 
129 Raphael Pura, Conflict Over East Timor May Test ASEAN Alliances, available [online]: 
http://www.Malaysia.net/sangkancil/1999-09/msg01219.html  
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new comer, ASEAN acknowledge that the political profile or its new members could not 
be ignored. This was also the so-called challenge of ASEAN’s post-Cold War. 
Economically, the new members will encounter ASEAN’s diversity of 
macroeconomic outlook, whose range of per-capita gross national product extended from 
Singapore’s $32, 940 to Cambodia’s $300 in 1998. More details can be found in Table 6. 
Given their past experience in forming the ASEAN-10, ASEAN leaders believe that only 
by joining ASEAN can East Timor survive, even though the newly independent East 
Timor will feel uncomfortable with the “ASEAN Way,” especially until some ASEAN 







Brunei 317 5,770 4.9 
Cambodia 10,430 181,040 2.9 
Indonesia 200,745 1,919,440 88.6 
Laos 5,200 236,800 1.1 
Malaysia 22,000 329,750 67.5 
Myanmar 49,500 678,500 19.0 
Philippines 74,044 300,000 64.5 
Singapore 3,076 648 84.4 
Thailand 62,910 514,000 117.0 
Vietnam 78,852 329,560 24.6 
 
Table 6. ASEAN’s Diversity. 
After Ref: [CIA Fact Book 1998 and the IMF] 
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN’s historic enlargement to integrate the 
whole of Southeast Asia has met both success and challenges. Therefore, this chapter 
                                                 
130 Sonny Inbaraj, The Geopolitics of East Timor: A Media Perspective, available [online] at: 
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tries to conclude that originally formed as an experiment in regional cooperation 
predicated on security concerns, after the Cold War ASEAN placed a new priority on 
enhancing the quality of its integration, and on the community. In terms of problem 
solving, the culture of non-interference and the avoidance of problems, is likely to change 
‘slightly’ under some circumstances. The depth of international involvement in 
Indonesia’s transition is a good example of addressing the changes of ASEAN’s 
avoidance in the countries’ internal affairs. Should East Timor choose independence and 
eventually join the ASEAN, it would likely challenge the non-interference principle, 
ASEAN though is unlikely formally to change its treaty commitment. The emergence of 
a reformist in Indonesia could lead to a substantial shift or more flexibility in the 
association’s operating practices.     
                                                 
































This chapter provides prospective recommendations concerning the independence 
of East Timor by starting with the understanding of what each other’s interests or 
objectives are, and what can be done to help the East Timorese rebuild their nation. This 
chapter also recommends what the proper future alliances for the new East Timor state 
should be, economically, politically, and in security. This will be related to the UN’s  
“constructive” role in East Timor’s preparation to be an independent state and its 
interaction with the main East Timorese political force in administering the transition 
towards independence, which includes reconciliation and organizing its internal affairs. 
A. ACTORS INTERESTS    
To effectively make recommendations for a future East Timor, it is important to 
fully understand all the objectives concerned in the East Timor case: 
1. Indonesian Actors 
• The Wahid Government. Its goals are a stable economic and 
political environment in which the state of Indonesia can grow 
strong and healthy. Its objective is the preservation of Indonesia 
and its elite. In President Wahid’s mind, his election was the result 
of compromises over how power would be shared among factions 
of Indonesia’s elite. He is willing to compromise with the 
provinces and allow them autonomy in a federalized, or Indonesian 
